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INTRODUCTION 
If an average person who lives with a dog were asked to describe the con-
nection between “papers and dogs,” he or she may talk about American Kennel 
Club (AKC) registration.1 Some people might also reference dogs who are “pa-
per trained.”2 However, individuals with disabilities, partnered with service or 
assistance dogs, may immediately think of the demands for documentation that 
they have been subject to when trying to enter businesses or rent housing.3 Ac-
cording to national surveys, the percentage of persons with disabilities in the 
United States is increasing.4 The number of persons with disabilities who 
 
1  Frequently Asked Questions, AM. KENNEL CLUB, https://www.apps.akc.org/apps/conta 
ct/answer_center/faq_dogreg.cfm [https://perma.cc/PMK5-3JST] (last visited Feb. 17, 2020)  
(listing a question, “My dog is a purebred, but it didn’t come with any papers. . . . Can I still 
register it with AKC?” and referring to “AKC papers”). AKC papers do not indicate quality, 
a dog with AKC-registered papers only means that the parents of the dog and litter are regis-
tered with the AKC. American Kennel Club Registration, LOUISVILLE KENNEL CLUB, 
http://www.louisvillekennelclub.org/new-akc [https://perma.cc/GRL9-BQ97] (last visited  
Feb. 17, 2020); Dog Owner Runs into Problems over AKC Registration, WRAL (Apr. 2, 
2009), https://www.wral.com/5onyourside/story/4879531/ [https://perma.cc/BS63-XKZG].  
AKC papers do not guarantee a purebred dog, and there are no qualifications regarding the 
temperament or health of the dogs. Id. AKC registration also does not necessarily guarantee 
the welfare of the dogs used in breeding programs. Jeff Rossen & Avni Patel, AKC-
Registered Breeders Raising Dogs in ‘Miserable’ Conditions, TODAY (May 1, 2013, 4:37 
AM), https://www.today.com/news/akc-registered-breeders-raising-dogs-miserable-conditio 
ns-6C9640008 [https://perma.cc/7DB7-ABE4] (discussing concerns over AKC-registered  
dogs from some breeders that in 2013 the AKC had only nine inspectors to cover the entire 
country). The AKC’s program does provide that an inspection can be triggered by com-
plaints. Inspection FAQs, AM. KENNEL CLUB, https://www.akc.org/inspections-and-complia 
nce/inspection-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/MKH8-XTFZ] (last visited Feb. 17, 2020). The  
AKC’s inspection includes determining if the breeder is in compliance with its Care and 
Conditions of Dogs Policy, which provides guidelines for care, housing and operations. Reg-
istration Policies: Care and Conditions of Dogs Policy, AM. KENNEL CLUB, https://www.a 
kc.org/rules/policy-manual/policy-manual-registration/ [https://perma.cc/BF37-WS6S] (last  
visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
2  A “paper-trained” dog has been trained to eliminate waste on a pad or in a litter box de-
signed for dogs. See How to Paper Train Small Dogs, ANIMAL PLANET, http://www.animal 
planet.com/pets/how-to-paper-train-small-dogs/ [https://perma.cc/BL4J-DJYX] (last visited  
Feb. 17, 2020) (discussing options and training). 
3  Fake Service Dogs, Real Problem or Not?: Hearing on the Possible Use of Fake Service 
Dogs and Fake Identification by Individuals to Obtain Special Access to Housing, Public 
Places or Airports/Airlines for Their Animal Before the S. Bus., Professions & Econ. Dev. 
Comm. 10 (Cal. 2014) [hereinafter California Senate Background Paper] (Background Pa-
per) (discussing confusion between emotional support animals and service animals partnered 
with individuals with psychiatric disabilities). 
4  LEWIS KRAUS, 2016 DISABILITY STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2016) (reporting that 
“[t]he percentage of people with disabilities in the [United States] rose from 11.9 [percent] in 
2010 to 12.6 [percent] in . . . 2015.”). The percentage of people with disabilities increases 
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choose to partner with service animals for assistance also appears to be grow-
ing.5 Even though the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) regulations re-
garding the permissible inquiries a public accommodation may make are 
straightforward, media reports and litigation, have made it clear that there is 
still widespread confusion.6 It is even more challenging for housing providers 
to determine their obligations under the Fair Housing Amendments Act 
(FHA).7 Although the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) regulations that became 
 
with age; however, over half of the people with disabilities are in the eighteen to sixty-four 
age group. Id.; see also Elizabeth A. Courtney-Long et al., Prevalence of Disability and Dis-
ability Type Among Adults—United States, 2013, CDC: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 
RPT. (July 31, 2015) (reporting that, in a survey of U.S. households, 22.2 percent of adults 
reported a disability). This was a higher percentage than was reported when researchers be-
gan collecting data in 1998. Id. 
5  California Senate Background Paper, supra note 3, at 7 (estimating the number of task-
trained service dogs in the United States to be between 100,000 and 200,000); Barbara Han-
delman, Service Dogs: Ethics and Education, INT’L ASS’N ANIMAL BEHAV. CONSULTANTS J. 
(2016) (reporting on the demand for trained service dogs); see also Mariko Yamamoto et al., 
Registrations of Assistance Dogs in California for Identification Tags: 1999–2012, 10 PLOS 
ONE 1, 1 (2015), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.013 
2820&type=printable [https://perma.cc/43CH-QZ4Y] (analyzing registration information 
and finding there has been a sharp increase in the number of service dogs registered in the 
state). 
6  E.g., Andy Alcock, Service Animal Thrown Out of Hospital, WCTV (last updated Jan. 28, 
2014, 8:32 PM), http://www.wctv.tv/home/headlines/Service-Animal-Thrown-Out-Of-Hos 
pital-242494921.html [https://perma.cc/GDB7-MJ9F] (reporting on an individual who was  
visiting a friend, who was told by hospital personnel that her service dog posed a security 
risk). The service dog was described as a pit bull in the media report. Id. The Florida State 
Attorney at the time declined to prosecute the hospital personnel for violating the Florida law 
protecting individuals with disabilities, stating, “I don’t see how having a pit bull running 
loose with you qualifies as a service dog” (quoting Willie Meggs, Fla. State Attorney). Id.; 
see also Holly V. Hays & Vic Ryckaert, Bias Claims Highlight Confusion Over Service Dog 
Law, INDYSTAR (Oct. 11, 2017, 5:51 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2017/10/11/ 
accusations-discrimination-highlight-confusion-over-service-dogs-and-law/753655001/[https 
://perma.cc/8ZZF-5S6K] (reporting on conflict at an apple picking orchard). As discussed 
below, the ADA regulations and guidance applicable to public accommodations require a 
case-by-case determination over whether an individual service dog poses a direct threat be-
fore it can be excluded, regardless of the dog’s breed. Infra note 48 and accompanying text 
(setting forth applicable language in regulations and guidance); see also Rebecca J. Huss, 
Hounds at the Hospital, Cats at the Clinic: Challenges Associated with Service Animals and 
Animal-Assisted Interventions in Healthcare Facilities, 40 U. HAW. L. REV. 53, 63–75 
(2018) [hereinafter Huss, Hounds at the Hospital] (analyzing disputes regarding service an-
imal access involving healthcare facilities). 
7  E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Approves Discrimination 
Agreement Between California Fair Housing Group and Marin County Landlords (Aug. 8, 
2017) (reporting on a conciliation agreement resolving a dispute over a service animal in 
housing); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Charges Massachusetts 
Housing Providers with Discriminating Against Residents with Disabilities (Aug. 20, 2018) 
(reporting on HUD charging property owners and their management company with housing 
discrimination on the basis of disability relating to not allowing dogs in properties); Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Charges Oklahoma Landlords with Dis-
criminating Against Veteran with Disabilities (Feb. 7, 2017) (reporting on a dispute with an 
Oklahoma landlord who refused to waive a pet fee in connection with an assistance animal); 
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effective in 2009 were drafted in a way to facilitate a layperson’s use, problems 
that arose in recent years triggered a recent rulemaking process.8 There are im-
portant distinctions among these statutes regarding what animals qualify as ser-
vice or assistance animals and how to determine whether a person should be 
granted an accommodation.9 
Complicating the issue is the perception by some that there is pervasive 
fraud being perpetrated by persons who are not entitled to have their dogs with 
them in public accommodations, housing, and on aircraft.10 There is regular 
media speculation that an increasing number of people mispresent companion 
animals as service or assistance animals.11 Entities that are required to allow 
 
Nick Ferraro, West St. Paul Apartment Owner Sued Over Bias Against Army Vet, His Sup-
port Dog, PIONEER PRESS (Oct. 9, 2017, 7:26 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2017/10/09/ 
west-st-paul-apartment-lawsuit-army-veteran-support-dog/ [https://perma.cc/34FA-CLYL]  
(reporting on filing of complaint with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment by a veteran alleging discrimination by a landlord over his emotional support dog). 
8  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 73 Fed. Reg. 27,614 (May 13, 
2008) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382), as corrected by Nondiscrimination on the Basis 
of Disability in Air Travel, 74 Fed. Reg. 11,469 (Mar. 18, 2009) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. 
pt. 382) [hereinafter 2009 Final Rule] (setting forth the effective date in May 2009 and dis-
cussing the question-answer format); see also Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 83 
Fed. Reg. 23,832 (May 23, 2018), (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382) (seeking comment on 
ACAA regulations); Lauren Etter, Opening Statements: When Dogs and Cats and Horses 
and Pigs Fly, A.B.A. J. 10, 10, 12 (Apr. 2014) (discussing media attention paid to issues 
arising under the Air Carrier Access Act but stating there are “more disputes over the use of 
service animals are related to housing, partly because housing law is more diverse.”). 
9  See infra Parts I and II (discussing definitions and process to determine whether an indi-
vidual with a disability accompanied by an animal should be accommodated). During the 
ACAA Reg-Neg process, discussed infra Section III.C, the working group of individuals 
focusing on service animal issues developed a definition matrix setting forth their view of 
the different definitions and other issues relating to the various acts. Service Animal Defini-
tion Matrix—Air Carrier Access Act vs. Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. 
1 (July 1, 2016), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/P3.SA_.HUD%20 
Matrix.6-28-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLR3-WHWL]. Note that although there are similarities  
in the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Americans with Disabilities Act regulations 
and the regulations promulgated by the DOJ relating to Title II and Title III of the ADA for 
public accommodations and public entities, there are some distinctions. See infra note 26 and 
accompanying text. 
10  See California Senate Background Paper, supra note 3, at 11–12; Beth Teitell, Service 
Dogs Barred, Doubted, and Deeply Treasured, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 18, 2013, 1:28 AM), http 
s://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/2013/09/18/the-growing-number-dogs-assisting-people-
with-invisible-conditions-causing-conflict-and-some-cases-confrontation/igPnUBYHa97 
K07ccBGJJVJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/4HK6-FHDU] (discussing conflicts between per-
sons with less apparent disabilities being partnered with service animals and conflicts occur-
ring with people who are skeptical over the need for the service animal); infra Part IV (dis-
cussing the issue of misrepresentation). 
11  See, e.g., California Senate Background Paper, supra note 3, at 11–13 (reporting on is-
sues relating to fraud); Hal Herzog, Service Animal Scams: A Growing Problem, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY (June 11, 2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/animals-and-us/20 
1406/service-animal-scams-growing-problem [https://perma.cc/FN3E-7TPN] (reporting on  
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access to persons utilizing service animals are apprehensive about problems 
with persons without disabilities using “ ‘fake’ service dogs” on their premis-
es.12 Persons with disabilities raise concerns that they have more difficulty ob-
taining access to businesses and housing when they are accompanied by legiti-
mate service or assistance animals.13 Based on recent legislation introduced in 
several states, the current federal system is not addressing these concerns.14 
This Article begins by providing background information on the current 
ADA regulations governing public accommodations and public entities’ inter-
action with persons with disabilities who utilize service animals.15 The issue of 
service animals under Title I of the ADA, protecting persons with disabilities in 
the area of employment, is also considered.16 
The Article then contrasts the language of the ADA regulations with the 
guidance provided by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) for housing providers subject to the FHA.17 Recent relevant case law 
interpreting the guidance will be utilized to assist in providing context.18 The 
 
ways that people misrepresent service and assistance animals and companies that sell certifi-
cations); Laws Aim to Crack Down on Fake Service Dogs, CBS NEWS (Apr. 11, 2017, 11:47 
AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/service-dogs-laws-imposter-pets-illegal/ [https://p 
erma.cc/URW7-A4VV] (reporting on concerns and state laws addressing issue); Michael 
Ollove, Several States Crack Down ‘Fake’ Service Animals, USA TODAY (Oct, 29, 2017), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/10/29/several-states-crack-down-fake-serviceani 
mals/807676001/ [https://perma.cc/H2EY-QTRT]. The issue has even arisen in a fictional 
television show when a character from the series Madam Secretary told his landlord that a 
friend’s dog he wanted to bring to his no-pets apartment was a support dog. Sarah Luoma, 
Madam Secretary Recap 01/13/19: Season 5 Episode 12 “Strategic Ambiguity”, CELEB 
DIRTY LAUNDRY (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.celebdirtylaundry.com/2019/madam-secretary 
-recap-01-13-19-season-5-episode-12-strategic-ambiguity/ [https://perma.cc/9K8G-Z7BB].  
The reported health benefits resulting from interaction with animals has been called into 
question by some. Kate Thayer, Despite the Popularity of Emotional Support Animals, Ex-
perts Say There’s Little Evidence They Work, CHI. TRIB. (May 30, 2018), https://www.chica 
gotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-life-emotional-support-animals-evidence-20180521-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/PX3H-7UCG] (reporting that studies have had mixed results); see also Re-
becca J. Huss, Canines at the Company, Felines at the Factory: The Risks and Rewards of 
Incorporating Service Animals and Companion Animals into the Workplace, 123 DICKINSON 
L. REV. 363, 388–89 (2019) [hereinafter Huss, Company] (discussing concerns over some of 
the methodology utilized to support claims of the benefits of interaction with animals). 
12  California Senate Hearing Background Paper, supra note 3, at 12. Entities also raise con-
cerns that they could have possible liability due to a fake service animal causing harm while 
on the premises. Id. at 13. 
13  Id. at 12; Laws Aim to Crack Down on Fake Service Dogs, supra note 11 (reporting on 
how fake service dogs can negatively impact the public’s perception of real service dogs). 
14  See infra Section IV.A (discussing state laws intended to combat fraud). 
15  See infra Section I.A–B. 
16  See infra Section I.C. 
17  See infra Sections II.A–B. 
18  See sources cited infra notes 81, 84, 88–89. 
20 NEV. L.J. 785 
790 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:2 
next part of the Article focuses on the turmoil surrounding the ACAA regula-
tions governing access for airline passengers with service animals.19 
The Article considers ways in which some states have addressed the con-
cern of misrepresentation of the status of service or assistance animals, focus-
ing on the process of documenting the need for a service or assistance animal.20 
An analysis of the law in British Columbia, Canada, on service dog teams is 
included to illustrate how a formalized system of certification could be imple-
mented.21 The Article concludes by providing recommendations for persons 
who are required to follow these laws and the beneficiaries of the protection of 
the laws to reduce the likelihood of conflict over access.22 
 
19  See infra Sections III.A–C. 
20  See infra Section IV.A. 
21  See infra Section IV.B. 
22  See infra RECOMMENDATIONS. Although ethical and welfare issues relating to an animal 
acting in the role of a service or assistance animal should always be considered, that topic is 
beyond the scope of this Article. The author has addressed these issues in previous articles. 
See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, A Conundrum for Animal Activists: Can or Should the Current 
Legal Classification of Certain Animals Be Utilized to Improve the Lives of All Animals? The 
Intersection of Federal Disability Laws and Breed-Discriminatory Legislation, 2015 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 1561, 1565–67 (2015) [hereinafter Huss, Conundrum] (discussing some theoreti-
cal issues in the context of companion animals, including those serving as assistance ani-
mals); Huss, Company, supra note 11, at 404–05 (discussing some considerations relating to 
the treatment of animals and providing examples of philosophical work in recent years fo-
cusing on ethical issues involving companion animals); Huss, Hounds at the Hospital, supra 
note 6, at 108–12 (analyzing ethical and welfare concerns relating to animal-assisted inter-
ventions); Rebecca J. Huss, Re-Evaluating the Role of Companion Animals in the Era of the 
Aging Boomer, 47 AKRON L. REV. 497, 546–49 (2014) (raising ethical issues in connection 
with animal-assisted activities and service animals). Although commentators have proposed 
changing the status of animals as property—which results in humans determining if an ani-
mal will serve as an assistance animal—it does not appear that the legal status of animals is 
likely to change in the near future. Huss, Conundrum, supra note 22, at 1563–65 (consider-
ing the property status of animals); Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best 
Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 68–71 
(2002) (analyzing some of the theories regarding the status of animals as property). 
20 NEV. L.J. 785 
Spring 2020] PUPS, PAPERWORK, AND PROCESS 791 
I. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT23 
A. Title II and Title III—Public Entities and Public Accommodations 
It has been over ten years since the Department of Justice (DOJ) proposed 
new regulations amending Titles II and III of the ADA.24 Titles II and III of the 
ADA provide rights relating to access to public entities (state and local) and 
places of public accommodations for individuals with disabilities.25 The regula-
tions governing Title I of the ADA (protecting individuals with disabilities in 
regards to employment) were not amended at the same time and will be cov-
ered separately.26 
 
23  The ADA is a federal law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in a va-
riety of contexts. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 also prohibits discrimination and is applicable if an entity is receiving federal fund-
ing. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018). The Rehabilitation Act will not be analyzed separately in this 
Article. Recent case law has reiterated that the analysis of an individual’s right to be accom-
panied by a service animal under the Rehabilitation Act should utilize the language of the 
ADA service animal regulations. Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 
104, 120 (3d Cir. 2018) (stating that “logic dictates that the service animal regulations, alt-
hough technically interpreting the ADA, are no less relevant to the interpretation of the 
RA.”); see also HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., 1 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK 
§ 1.02 (5th ed. 2018) (discussing how cases interpreting the ADA have been used as guid-
ance in Rehabilitation Act cases and vice versa). 
24  Rebecca J. Huss, Why Context Matters: Defining Service Animals Under Federal Law, 37 
PEPP. L. REV. 1163, 1174 (2010) [hereinafter Huss, Context] (providing a brief history of the 
rulemaking process for the ADA that resulted in the service animal regulations effective in 
March 2011). 
25  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165, 12181–12189 (2018). Although generally it is uncontro-
versial whether an entity is considered a public accommodation, there still are situations 
where this factor can be important. Compare Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 
176–78 (3d Cir. 2019) (discussing the circuit split regarding whether plasma donation cen-
ters should be considered public accommodations under the ADA and finding the center at 
issue should be considered a public accommodation), with Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 907 
F.3d 323, 325, 329–32 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding a plasma donation center would not be con-
sidered a public accommodation under the ADA). Note that in a subsequent hearing, the 
Texas Supreme Court held that the plasma facility was a “public facility” under the Texas 
Human Resources code. Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 60–64 (Tex. 2019) 
(holding a plasma collection center was a “public facility” under Texas law). 
26  See infra Section I.C (discussing Title I’s interactive process); see also Huss, Company, 
supra note 11, at 372–88 (analyzing issues relating to service animals under Title I of the 
ADA). Note that, although there are similarities in the Department of Transportation’s 
(DOT) Americans with Disabilities Act regulations and the regulations promulgated by the 
DOJ relating to Title II and Title III of the ADA for public accommodations and public enti-
ties, there are some distinctions. Service Animal Definition Matrix, supra note 9. The DOT 
issued guidance in 2011 and 2015 emphasizing that the DOT’s ADA regulations were unaf-
fected by the DOJ’s adoption of regulations effective in March 2011. DOJ Rule on Service 
Animals and Mobility Devices (Note), U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (2011) (last updated Mar. 16, 
2016), https://www.transit.dot.gov/regulations-and-guidance/civil-rights-ada/doj-rule-service 
-animals-and-mobility-devices-note [https://perma.cc/T352-BFAM] (advising the DOT did 
not change its ADA regulations applicable to private and public sector transportation); U.S. 
DEP’T TRANSP., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA): GUIDANCE, CIRCULAR NO. FTA 
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The ADA’s protection covers only those persons who are considered disa-
bled.27 The ADA defines disability as “with respect to an individual—(A) a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities of such individual[.]”28 An individual with “a record of such an im-
pairment” or “being regarded as having such an impairment” is included in the 
definition of disabled.29 “Major life activities” is defined by the ADA as “not 
limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, 
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, 
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”30 
If an entity is covered by Title II and Title III of the ADA, it is required to 
make “reasonable modifications” in policies or procedures, if such modifica-
tions are required to “afford goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 
or accommodations to individuals with disabilities.”31 This may include permit-
ting the use of a service animal in a location normally off limits to animals.32 
Entities are not required to make a modification if it would “fundamentally al-
ter” the nature of the services, accommodations, etc.33 
The ADA regulations under Title II and III now include a definition of 
“service animal.”34 Service animal is defined as “any dog that is individually 
 
C 4710.1 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 DOT ADA GUIDANCE] (providing guidance and setting 
forth the relevant regulations). Relevant language in the DOT’s ADA regulations will be 
provided as footnote references; however, this Article will not discuss the DOT regulations 
in depth. 
27  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2018). ADA, in this Article, refers to this law as amended by the 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
28  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2018). 
29  Id. § 12102(1)(B)–(C). 
30  Id. § 12102(2)(A). 
31  28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a) (2019); see also id. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). 
32  Id. §§ 35.136(a), 36.302(c)(1). Note even if an animal does not qualify as a service ani-
mal, a person may claim that the general obligation to make a modification should apply. 
Mayle v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 18C6211, 2019 WL 2773681, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 
2019) (finding that although a Guinea Hog would not be considered a service animal, an in-
dividual could pursue his claim that it was a reasonable accommodation to allow him to 
bring the animal into city parks). 
33  28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i); see id. § 36.302(a). 
34  Id. §§ 35.104, 36.104. The DOJ dealt with the issue of limiting the species of service an-
imals by using dogs in the definition but allowing for miniature horses. Id. §§ 35.136(i), 
36.302(c)(9)(i) (2019); see also Huss, Context, supra note 24, at 1181–82 (discussing the 
issue of species in the rulemaking process). Religious organizations and entities controlled 
by religious organizations will generally be excluded from the coverage of Title III of the 
ADA. 28 C.F.R. § 36.102(e) (2019) (excluding religious entities from Title III); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12187 (2018). As an example, an entity such as a hospital—which would normally be a 
public accommodation—controlled by a religious organization would not be covered under 
the ADA. 28 C.F.R. § 36.102(e); 42 U.S.C. § 12187. Whether an entity is controlled by a 
religious organization is a question of fact. See Reed v. Columbia St. Mary’s Hosp., 236 F. 
Supp. 3d 1091, 1104 (E.D. Wis. 2017) (determining the hospital fell within the exemption 
under Title III of the ADA through an analysis of the organizational structure). A state law 
may provide more expansive coverage of religious entities given the exemption in the ADA. 
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trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disa-
bility, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental 
disability.”35 The definition of service animal specifies that “the provision of 
emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship do[es] not constitute 
work or tasks for the purposes of this definition.”36 Under certain circumstanc-
es, entities may need to make reasonable accommodations to permit the use of 
a miniature horse as a service animal.37 
The current regulations do not allow entities to require documentation sup-
porting an animal’s status as a service animal or inquire “about the nature or 
extent of a person’s disability.”38 Entities may only “ask if the animal is re-
 
Stevens v. Optimum Health Inst., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1078, 1081, 1097–98, 1100 (S.D. 
Cal. 2011) (holding the ADA did not preempt California’s more expansive Unruh civil rights 
law where a holistic health program of a religious organization allegedly denied an individu-
al access regardless of whether the individual was accompanied by her guide dog). 
35  28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104. The definition continues: 
Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals 
for the purposes of this definition. The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be di-
rectly related to the individual’s disability. Examples of work or tasks include, but are not lim-
ited to, assisting individuals who are blind or have low vision with navigation and other tasks, 
alerting individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people or sounds, provid-
ing non-violent protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, assisting an individual during a 
seizure, alerting individuals to the presence of allergens, retrieving items such as medicine or the 
telephone, providing physical support and assistance with balance and stability to individuals 
with mobility disabilities, and helping persons with psychiatric and neurological disabilities by 
preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive behaviors. 
Id. §§ 35.104, 36.104. There is limited case law interpreting the training component of the 
definition. Cf. Waddell v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts, U.S., Inc., No. G054614, 2018 WL 
4042670, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2018) (analyzing the training requirement under Cali-
fornia law); Huss, Company, supra note 11, at 377–78 (discussing the training requirement 
in the context of Title I of the ADA utilizing information relevant to Titles II and III of the 
ADA). A recent California case found that a plaintiff did not meet her burden of showing 
that her service dog was trained, relying in part on the fact that a training school the plaintiff 
utilized did not certify the plaintiff and animal as a team. C.L. v. Del Amo Hosp., No. SA 
CV 18-0475-DOC (DFMx), 2019 WL 4187848, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2019). It is clear 
that a request to allow a service animal in training on premises may be denied under the 
ADA, though state laws may allow such access. Huss, Hounds at the Hospital, supra note 6, 
at 83–87 (discussing issues relating to state laws providing for access for service animals in 
training). 
36  28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104; see also Amanda M. Foster, Don’t Be Distracted by the 
Peacock Trying to Board an Airplane: Why Emotional Support Animals Are Service Animals 
and Should Be Regulated in the Same Manner, 82 ALB. L. REV. 237, 263–65 (2018–19) (ar-
guing the definition of service animal in the ADA should be expanded to include emotional 
support animals). 
37  28 C.F.R. § 35.136(i)(1); see also id. § 36.302(c)(9)(ii)(A–D) (setting forth factors to as-
sess whether an entity must accommodate an individual who is partnered with a miniature 
horse acting as a service animal). There is no species limitation in the DOT’s ADA regula-
tion. 49 C.F.R. § 37.3 (2018) (including “or other animal” in the definition). 
38  28 C.F.R. §§ 35.136(f), 36.302(c)(6). Even though it has been over a decade since the 
ADA regulations clarified the limited inquiries that can be made, some public accommoda-
tions continue to ask for documentation. E.g., Smith v. Morgan, No. 5:18-cv-01111-AKK, 
2019 WL 1930764, at *2–3 (N.D. Ala. May 1, 2019) (analyzing a case where employees of a 
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quired because of a disability and what work or task the animal has been 
trained to perform.”39 However, those two inquiries generally should not be 
made by an entity “when it is readily apparent that an animal is trained to do 
work or perform tasks for an individual with a disability,” with the regulations 
using as examples “providing assistance with stability or balance to an individ-
ual with an observable mobility disability.”40 
B. Title II and Title III—Rulemaking Process 
During the rulemaking process, the DOJ addressed the idea of mandating 
certification or licensing requirements for individuals with service animals.41 
The DOJ acknowledged some commenters had suggested behavior and training 
requirements.42 Some commenters proposed detailed and lengthy options.43 
Although there are organizations that promote minimum training or testing be-
fore a service animal should have “public access,” the ADA regulations do not 
articulate any specific positive standards for behavior of service animals.44 In-
stead the DOJ included language in the regulations clarifying that the handler 
of the service animal (generally the person with the disability) is responsible for 
controlling his or her service animal.45 An entity governed by Title II or Title 
III of the ADA may exclude a service animal from the premises if: “(1) [t]he 
animal is out of control and the animal’s handler does not take effective action 
 
convenience store requested documentation to support an individual with a hearing impair-
ment who was utilizing a service animal). 
39  28 C.F.R. §§ 35.136(f), 36.302(c)(6). The DOT’s ADA guidance provides that the same 
two questions can be asked. 2015 DOT ADA GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 2-17. 
40  28 C.F.R. §§ 35.136(f), 36.302(c)(6). 
41  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 75 
Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,197–98 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35); see also 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial 
Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,236, 56,271–72 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 
36) (providing guidance on and implementing the final regulations). 
42  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 56,198; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommoda-
tions and in Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,272. 
43  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 56,198; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommoda-
tions and in Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,272. 
44  E.g., IAADP Minimum Training Standards for Public Access, INT’L ASS’N OF ASSISTANCE 
DOG PARTNERS, http://www.iaadp.org/iaadp-minimum-training-standards-for-public-acces 
s.html [https://perma.cc/68HC-TU8U] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020) (setting forth minimum  
training standards for assistance dogs working in public places and providing an example of 
a public access test utilized by another organization). 
45  28 C.F.R. §§ 35.136(d)–(e), 36.302(c)(4)–(5). The handler of the service animal may con-
trol the animal through voice control or other signals or can be tethered to or have physical 
control over the animal. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.136(d), 36.302(c)(4). 
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to control it; or (2) [t]he animal is not housebroken.”46 Furthermore, the DOJ’s 
guidance on the ADA regulations requires entities to make an individualized 
determination about whether an animal may be excluded.47 The individualized 
analysis cannot be based simply on a generalized fear of animals or specific 
breed of dog.48 
One argument that was made was “that without such standards, the public 
has no way to differentiate between untrained pets and service animals.”49 The 
DOJ expressed the concern that “[a] training and certification requirement 
would increase the expense of acquiring a service animal and might limit ac-
cess to service animals for individuals with limited financial resources.”50 
The DOJ also articulated that a certification process “would not serve the 
full array of individuals with disabilities who use service animals, since indi-
viduals with disabilities may be capable of training, and some have trained, 
their service animal[s] to perform tasks or do work to accommodate their disa-
 
46  Id. §§ 35.136(b), 36.302(c)(2). An entity must still provide the individual with a disability 
the opportunity to obtain the services even if the entity has properly excluded a service ani-
mal. Id. §§ 35.136(c), 36.302(c)(3). 
47  Id. §§ 35.104, 36.104 (stating a direct threat is “a significant risk to the health or safety of 
others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures”); see 
also Huss, Company, supra note 11, at 386–88 (analyzing direct threat language of the Title 
II and Title III ADA regulations). 
48  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 56,194; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommoda-
tions and in Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,268. 
The Department does not believe that it is either appropriate or consistent with the ADA to defer 
to local laws that prohibit certain breeds of dogs based on local concerns that these breeds may 
have a history of unprovoked aggression or attacks. . . . [Entities] have the ability to determine, 
on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular service animal can be excluded based on that par-
ticular animal’s actual behavior or history—not based on fears or generalizations about how an 
animal or breed might behave. This ability to exclude an animal whose behavior or history evi-
dences a direct threat is sufficient to protect health and safety. 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 56,194; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommoda-
tions and in Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,268; see also Huss, Conundrum, su-
pra note 22, at 1574–80 (analyzing case law and guidance relating to breed-discriminatory 
legislation and the ADA); Frequently Asked Questions About Service Animals and the ADA, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. Q22–Q25 (July 20, 2015), [hereinafter DOJ FAQ], 
https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/service_animal_qa.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD7N-J87T] (last  
visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
49  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 56,198; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommoda-
tions and in Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,272. 
50  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 56,198; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommoda-
tions and in Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,272. A higher percentage of persons 
with disabilities live in poverty in comparison to people without disabilities in the United 
States. KRAUS, supra note 4, at 23; see also Huss, Company, supra note 11, at 365–66 (dis-
cussing the percentage of persons with disabilities who are employed compared with persons 
without disabilities). 
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bilit[ies].”51 The issue of concerns about misrepresentation regarding the status 
of an animal is discussed in Part IV below.52 
C. Title I—Employment Relationship 
Title I of the ADA prohibits private employers, as well as state and local 
governments, from discriminating against employees or prospective employees 
who have disabilities.53 Unlike Titles II and III of the ADA, there is no specific 
definition of service animal in the Title I regulations, although there are refer-
ences to service animals in guidance provided by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC).54 Because of this, there is a lack of clarity over 
whether animals who are not specifically trained to do work or perform tasks 
qualify as service animals under Title I.55 
Unlike the vagueness regarding the definition of service animal under Title 
I, there is widespread acceptance when employers determine whether an em-
ployee should be allowed to be accompanied by his or her service animal in the 
workplace, that the employer use the same process as other accommodation re-
quests to determine whether such request is reasonable.56 
The employee has the burden to begin the process by requesting a reasona-
ble accommodation.57 In the event it is not obvious there is a need for an ac-
 
51  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 56,198; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommoda-
tions and in Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,272. 
52  Infra Part IV (discussing concerns about misrepresentation and fraud and how some states 
have proposed or passed legislation to address the issue). 
53  42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–117 (2018). Additional covered entities under Title I include em-
ployment agencies and labor organizations. Id. § 12111(2). Individuals are limited in their 
ability to recover money damages from states; however, suits for injunctive relief are still 
possible. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364, 374 (2001); see also Huss, Company, su-
pra note 11, at 372–73 (discussing the scope of Title I of the ADA and the need for the em-
ployee or prospective employee to be a qualified individual under Title I). 
54  Huss, Company, supra note 11, at 374–79 (analyzing lack of definition of service animal 
in administrative guidance and cases involving Title I of the ADA); Accommodation and 
Compliance: Service Animals as Workplace Accommodations, JOB ACCOMMODATION 
NETWORK, https://askjan.org/topics/servanim.cfm?cssearch=1989944_1 [https://perma.cc/4Y 
7G-WF7V] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020) (stating there is no specific definition of service ani-
mal in Title I or its regulations and providing guidance on how employers should approach 
the issue of employees asking that their service animals be allowed to accompany them in 
the workplace). The EEOC and DOJ share jurisdiction over the enforcement of Title I of the 
ADA. Fighting Discrimination in Employment Under the ADA, ADA, https://www.ada.gov 
/employment.htm [https://perma.cc/X6B5-9NVR] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
55  Huss, Company, supra note 11, at 376–79 (analyzing the issue of emotional support ani-
mals under Title I of the ADA). 
56  Id. at 379–88 (discussing application of Title I of the ADA). 
57  29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (2019); see, e.g., Connelly v. Wellstar Health Sys., Inc., No. 1:16-CV-
2687-RWS, 2018 WL 1835582, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2018) (granting employer’s mo-
tion for summary judgment when the plaintiff stated she never requested an emotional sup-
port animal, although in her complaint she alleged the employer “fail[ed] to allow her to 
have a pet as an emotional companion”). 
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commodation, an employer may require that documentation be provided to 
support the request.58 Guidance from the EEOC states, accommodation is best 
determined through “an informal, interactive process with the individual with a 
disability . . . .”59 A party’s failure to engage in a good faith interactive process 
can be a consideration in determining potential liability for violation of Title I 
of the ADA.60 
Interpretive guidance provided by the EEOC recommends employers uti-
lize a four-part approach for this process. Employers should: 
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose and essential 
functions; 
(2) Consult with the individual with a disability to ascertain the precise job-
related limitations imposed by the individual’s disability and how those 
limitations could be overcome with a reasonable accommodation; 
(3) In consultation with the individual to be accommodated, identify potential 
accommodations and assess the effectiveness each would have in enabling 
the individual to perform the essential functions of the position; and 
(4) Consider the preference of the individual to be accommodated and select and 
implement the accommodation that is most appropriate for both the em-
ployee and the employer.61 
Employers are not required to provide an accommodation if doing so 
would create an “undue hardship” for the employer.62 Factors to determine 
whether an accommodation is an undue hardship include if such accommoda-
tion would be disruptive or would fundamentally alter the nature of the busi-
ness.63 The impact of an accommodation on other employees may also be con-
sidered if such accommodation would affect the other employees’ abilities to 
perform their duties.64 
An employee partnered with a service animal may pose a significant risk of 
substantial harm to other people at the workplace in a way that would support 
an undue hardship argument.65 The focus is on whether an individual employee 
 
58  29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(e). 
59  Id. § 1630.2(o)(3). 
60  See, e.g., Assaturian v. Hertz Corp., No. 13-00299 DKW KSC, 2014 WL 4374430, at *9–
10 (D. Haw. Sept. 2, 2014) (analyzing obligations of parties to engage in an interactive pro-
cess where an employee allegedly requested permission to bring his service animal to work 
as an accommodation). 
61  29 C.F.R. § 1630 App. (2019). It is necessary to begin by determining the purpose and 
essential functions of a job because employers must only provide a modification if the per-
son with the disability is a “qualified individual”—a person who “satisfies the requisite skill, 
experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position,” with 
a disability is a qualified individual if that person, “with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the employment position.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) 
(2019) (emphasis added); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). 
62  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(4); see also Huss, Company, supra note 11, at 383–88 (analyzing 
the issue of undue burden in the context of Title I and service animals). 
63  See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p). 
64  Id. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v). 
65  See id. § 1630.2(r). 
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poses such risk, and like the lack of a definition for service animal under Title 
I, there is no specific language in the Title I regulations addressing under what 
circumstances a service animal constitutes a direct threat.66 The general regula-
tions do support that assessment of harm (presumably posed by the human-
service animal team) must be made using objective evidence.67 
Issues relating to allergies have been the basis for an employer’s claim that 
allowing a service dog in the workplace would be an undue hardship.68 Alt-
hough it may be possible to prohibit a service animal in some particular types 
of workplaces due to issues involving allergies, slight inconveniences to em-
ployees without disabilities is likely not sufficient to support an employer’s ar-
gument that allowing a service animal would be an undue hardship.69 
Even if allowing the service animal on the premises is not considered an 
undue hardship, if there are options for the types of accommodation, employers 
have the ability to choose the accommodation that is easiest for them to pro-
vide.70 This discretion is not without limit, however, as EEOC guidance pro-
vides “the preference of the individual with a disability should be given prima-
ry consideration” if more than one accommodation is available that would 
enable the employee to perform the essential functions of the job.71 
Because of the lack of specific regulations regarding service animals under 
Title I of the ADA, employers and employees must rely on the general regula-
tions governing the obligation of the parties to determine whether a requested 
accommodation is considered reasonable.72 The interpretation of Title I of the 
ADA generally provides that employees have the initial obligation to request an 
accommodation, documentation may be required, and an interactive process 
should be used.73 It is less clear what type of process is required if an individual 
with a disability requests the ability to have an assistance animal in housing 
 
66  Huss, Company, supra note 11, at 383–88 (analyzing direct threat under Title I of the 
ADA). 
67  29 C.F.R. § 1630(r) (the regulations continue by providing factors to consider including: 
“(1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The like-
lihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.”). 
68  E.g., Maubach v. City of Fairfax, No. 1:17-cv-921, 2018 WL 2018552, at *6 (E.D. Va. 
Apr. 30, 2018); see also Huss, Company, supra note 11, at 384–85 (analyzing issue of aller-
gies in the context of an employment environment). 
69  See Huss, Company, supra note 11, at 384–85 (analyzing issue of allergies in the context 
of an employment environment). 
70  29 C.F.R. § 1630 App. (stating “the employer providing the accommodation has the ulti-
mate discretion to choose between effective accommodations, and may choose . . . the ac-
commodation that is easier for it to provide.”). 
71  Id. 
72  Supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text (analyzing Title I of the ADA). 
73  Supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (analyzing the process under Title I of the 
ADA). 
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that does not allow animals.74 The next Part of this Article will explore the am-
biguities surrounding this issue under the FHA.75 
II. FAIR HOUSING ACT76 
Under the FHA, housing providers (and others) are not allowed to refuse 
“to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, 
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal op-
portunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”77 A waiver of a no-pet provision may be 
one of the modifications required.78 
A. Assistance Animals Under the FHA 
Unlike Titles II and III of the ADA, the FHA’s regulations do not contain a 
definition of service or assistance animal; however, HUD has issued guidance 
to assist in interpretation of the law.79 This guidance makes it clear that, alt-
hough “service animals” as defined by the ADA regulations would be included 
 
74  Infra notes 106–12 and accompanying text (analyzing the process under the FHA). 
75  Infra notes 106–12 and accompanying text (analyzing the process under the FHA). 
76  42 U.S.C. § 3601–3631 (2018). The Fair Housing Act was included as part of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 and was amended in 1988 with the Fair Housing Amendments Act to add 
persons with disabilities to the classes of persons to be protected from discrimination. Fair 
Housing Act, HISTORY, (Sept. 12, 2018) https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/fair- 
housing-act [https://perma.cc/XAT8-8D7E]. Although some commentators refer to this  
amended law as the Fair Housing Amendments Act, others continue to refer to it as the Fair 
Housing Act, and “FHA” will be used to refer to the amended law in this Article. For more 
background and discussion of the coverage of the FHA, see Rebecca J. Huss, No Pets Al-
lowed: Housing Issues and Companion Animals, 11 ANIMAL L. 69, 73–90 (2005). 
77  42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). “Necessary” in this context does not require that an individual 
is unable to function at all without the animal; instead, the animal can provide support or 
perform tasks that alleviate a symptom or effect of a disability. E.g., Hollandale Apartments 
& Health Club, LLC v. Bonesteel, 173 A.D.3d 55, 65–68 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (analyzing 
“necessity” for emotional support animal under federal and New York law). 
78  24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) (2018) (providing an example of a manager of an apartment com-
plex allowing a person with a visual impairment to live with a service animal despite a no-
pets policy). Another example would be waiver of an ordinance limiting the number of ani-
mals at a residence. Cartwright v. Bartling, No. 8:14CV246, 2015 WL 3822362, at *7–8 (D. 
Neb. June 19, 2015) (denying a city’s motion to dismiss a case wherein a resident alleged 
discrimination when city denied request to have two service animals, which would result in 
the resident’s household exceeding the number of animals allowed per residence). 
79  U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SERVICE ANIMALS AND ASSISTANCE ANIMALS FOR 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN HOUSING AND HUD-FUNDED PROGRAMS 4 (2013) [hereinafter 
2013 HUD ASSISTANCE ANIMALS]; JOINT STATEMENT DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV. AND 
DEP’T JUSTICE, REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 1, 6 (2004) 
[hereinafter 2004 JOINT STATEMENT] (setting forth technical assistance relating to the FHA). 
In addition to the discussion of the definition of assistance animal, documentation, and pro-
cess analyzed herein, HUD guidance also provides that, although housing providers may re-
quire tenants to pay for the cost of any damage caused to a unit or common areas, they are 
not allowed to require deposits for assistance animals. 2013 HUD ASSISTANCE ANIMALS, 
supra. 
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in the definition of “assistance animals” (who may be required to be allowed to 
live with a person with a disability as a reasonable accommodation), other ani-
mals may also qualify.80 Specifically, there is no species limitation under the 
FHA, and HUD has made it clear that nothing in the FHA requires an assis-
tance animal be certified or have had individual training.81 Thus an animal who 
only provides emotional support (and does not perform tasks or do work) could 
qualify as an assistance animal under the FHA.82 
The distinction between a “pet,” or companion animal, and an assistance 
animal is that assistance animals must provide aid (through work, tasks, or oth-
erwise) or emotional support “that alleviates one or more identified symptoms 
or effects of a person’s disability.”83 For example, a landlord could reject the 
request from an individual with a physical disability who requests the ability to 
keep an assistance animal who solely provides emotional support.84 Only if a 
 
80  2013 HUD ASSISTANCE ANIMALS, supra note 79, at 2 (providing information on assis-
tance animals and including in the definition animals who work or perform tasks). 
81  Id. at 2, 7; see, e.g., Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 362–63 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(reversing lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of city in case involving a 
claim that a miniature horse should be allowed to be kept on the premises); Manzke v. Jef-
ferson Cty., No. 18-cv-505-bbc, 2018 WL 3998035, at *1, 5 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 21, 2018) 
(denying motion for preliminary injunctive relief and discussing how the evidence provided 
by the plaintiff supporting her claim that she required a reasonable accommodation to keep 
goats and geese did not provide sufficient detail, or “provide[] any reason why plaintiff’s 
medical support animals must be farm animals rather than domesticated animals . . . which 
are allowed in her zoning classification.”); Castellano v. Access Premier Realty, Inc., 181 F. 
Supp. 3d 798, 806–08 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (finding defendants failed to provide a reasonable 
accommodation when they refused her permission to keep her cat, which served as an emo-
tional support animal, in her apartment). Claims relating to the keeping of non-domesticated 
animals may be subject to the direct threat analysis discussed infra note 87 and accompany-
ing text. E.g., Baughman v. City of Elkhart, No. 6:17-CV-326, 2018 WL 1510678, at *1, 7 
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2018) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant because re-
quest for accommodation to keep lemur who had injured at least three people was not rea-
sonable). 
82  See 2013 HUD ASSISTANCE ANIMALS, supra note 79, at 2. 
83  Id. (emphasis added). This is viewed more generally as “an identifiable relationship, or 
nexus, between the requested accommodation and the individual’s disability.” 2004 JOINT 
STATEMENT, supra note 79, at 6–7 (providing example of tenant with a hearing impairment 
requesting that provider allow him to keep a dog in his unit to alert him to sounds). 
84  Kennedy House, Inc. v. Philadelphia Comm’n on Human Relations, 143 A.3d 476, 491 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) (reversing lower court order because the documentation provided by 
“physician described a disability related to mobility, and there was no evidence establishing 
a nexus between her mobility-related needs and the requested assistance animal.”). The 
judge dissenting in the Kennedy House, Inc. case would find that the record supported “nu-
merous, significant medical conditions” and the assistance of the dog (e.g., encouraging her 
to get out of bed and to remember to take medications), concluding “this type of support di-
rectly relates to [the prospective tenant’s] mobility disability.” Id. at 493 (J. McCullough dis-
senting). 
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person has a disability85 and there is a disability-related need for the particular 
animal is it necessary for a housing provider to modify a no-pets policy.86 
Paralleling the guidance supporting the Title II and Title III ADA service 
animal regulations, an individualized assessment as to whether a specific assis-
tance animal constitutes a direct threat to other people or property is required 
before a request to accommodate such assistance animal can be denied.87 Simi-
larly, “[b]reed, size, and weight limitations may not be applied to an assistance 
animal.”88 
B. Documentation Allowed to be Required to Support a Request Relating to 
an Assistance Animal 
HUD guidance provides that “[h]ousing providers may ask individuals who 
have disabilities that are not readily apparent or known to the provider to sub-
mit reliable documentation of a disability and their disability-related need for 
an assistance animal.”89 HUD guidance also states that housing providers “may 
 
85  Defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities[.]” 2013 HUD ASSISTANCE ANIMALS, supra note 79, at 4. 
86  Id. A housing provider is not required to make such modification if “doing so would im-
pose an undue financial and administrative burden or would fundamentally alter the nature 
of the housing provider’s services.” Id. 
87  Id.; see, e.g., Borenstein v. Garden, No. 2:19-cv-00482-RFB-NJK, 2019 WL 2062948, at 
*2–3 (D. Nev. May 9, 2019) (denying further preliminary relief when tenant with allegedly 
aggressive service dog did not comply with court order muzzling dog when the dog was out-
side the dwelling); Roberts v. Veterans Vill. Enters., Inc., No. 17cv524-LAB (MDD), 2017 
WL 1063477, at *2–3, 5–6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2017) (denying temporary restraining order 
against a group home that denied a resident his request to keep a dog as an assistance animal 
when the dog had allegedly exhibited behaviors such as nipping and charging); Washington 
v. Olatoye, 173 A.D.3d 467, 470–71 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (setting forth the analysis for 
direct threat in finding that a hearing officer failed to address a reasonable accommodation 
request); Gill Terrace Ret. Apartments, Inc. v. Johnson, 177 A.3d 1087, 1092–93 (Vt. 2017) 
(affirming lower court decision concluding there was evidence that a dog posed a direct 
threat, including lunging and baring her teeth at people and other dogs, supported the deci-
sion by the landlord to deny the request to keep the dog on the premises); cf. King’s Daugh-
ters & Sons Hous., Inc. v. Farrell, No. NWHCV186003784S, 2018 WL 8642169, *3, 5 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2018) (providing that in order to continue a tenancy an individual 
would need to obtain a new service dog due to safety issues posed by his existing service 
dog). 
88  2013 HUD ASSISTANCE ANIMALS, supra note 79, at 4; see also Warren v. Delvista Tow-
ers Condo. Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1089 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (determining that a local ordi-
nance banning a specific breed of dog was preempted by the FHA); Huss, Conundrum, supra 
note 22, at 1581–87 (analyzing the interaction of the FHA and breed-discriminatory ordi-
nances and polices). But see Wilkison v. City of Arapahoe, 926 N.W.2d 441, 451–52 (Neb. 
2019) (distinguishing between a reasonable and necessary accommodation and finding in a 
case where an individual had multiple dogs in the home, it was not necessary for a city to 
waive a breed-specific ordinance). 
89  2013 HUD ASSISTANCE ANIMALS, supra note 79, at 4. If a housing provider knows of the 
disability or disability-related need, or the need is readily apparent, a housing provider may 
not ask a tenant to provide documentation to support the need. Id. at 6. Cases have recog-
nized that housing providers are not required to immediately grant a request, but may evalu-
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not ask an applicant or tenant to provide access to medical records or medical 
providers or provide detailed or extensive information or documentation of a 
person’s physical or mental impairments.”90 
The issue of who can provide the documentation is also covered by HUD 
guidance.91 In situations where an individual is asking for an accommodation of 
an emotional support animal, that person can be asked “to provide documenta-
tion from a physician, psychiatrist, social worker, or other mental health profes-
sional that the animal provides emotional support that alleviates one or more of 
the identified symptoms or effects of an existing disability.”92 Other HUD 
guidance provides that determining whether an individual meets the FHA’s def-
inition of a person with a disability can be accomplished through verification 
by a “doctor or other medical professional, a peer support group, a non-medical 
service agency, or a reliable third party who is in a position to know about the 
individual’s disability.”93 The level of detail in any such documentation is also 
discussed in HUD guidance with the documentation deemed “sufficient if it es-
tablishes that an individual has a disability and that the animal in question will 
provide some type of disability-related assistance or emotional support” and 
“[i]n most cases, an individual’s medical records or detailed information about 
the nature of a person’s disability is not necessary for this inquiry.”94 
Case law has also established that there are limits to the level of documen-
tation that can be requested.95 For example in Bone v. Village Club, Inc.,96 in its 
 
ate a request, investigate if necessary, and as discussed below, enter into an interactive pro-
cess. E.g., Larosa v. River Quarry Apartments, L.L.C., No. 1:18-cv-00384-BLW, 2019 WL 
3538951, at *6–7 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2019) (discussing the process in which an apartment en-
gaged in to determine whether a request should be granted). 
90  2013 HUD ASSISTANCE ANIMALS, supra note 79, at 6. It is an individualized assessment 
to determine whether the person requesting the accommodation has a disability-related need 
for an assistance animal. Id. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  2004 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 79, at 13–14; see infra notes 344, 346 and accompa-
nying text (discussing importance of this language in connection with legislation introduced 
in Virginia in January 2017). 
94  2013 HUD ASSISTANCE ANIMALS, supra note 79, at 6; 2004 JOINT STATEMENT, supra 
note 79, at 14. 
95  Infra Section II.C (analyzing some case law addressing documentation issue); e.g., Cas-
tellano v. Access Premier Realty, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 3d 798, 806–08 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (reject-
ing defendants’ arguments that repeated demands for more specific information to support 
the tenant’s request was unnecessary given the information previously provided, and the 
court “cannot ascertain what information could ever satisfy the knowledge requirement were 
Defendants’ position to be accepted”; in connection with the need for the assistance animal, 
given the provision of information from medical professionals, the tenant “need provide 
nothing more to meet the requirements of the FHA.”); cf. Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. 
Patlan, No. E069793, 2019 WL 3955868, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2019) (finding as a 
matter of law a prospective tenant did not have to present a letter designating her dog as an 
emotional support animal or formal statement of diagnosis to fall within the protection of the 
state law’s protection). It may be reasonable for a housing provider to request documentation 
to support the accommodation again if there is a change in circumstance of the tenant. 
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analysis supporting a denial of summary judgment motions, the district court 
found the landlord’s request for information overbroad in asking for a tenant’s 
“medical records [] rather than simply asking for verification from a healthcare 
provider that [tenant] suffered from a disability.”97 The Bone court also found it 
was inappropriate for the landlord to ask for information to demonstrate that the 
dog, who was acting as an emotional support animal, had special skills, train-
ing, or certification.98 The court in Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condomini-
um Ass’n, found that the information requested by a condominium board re-
garding a resident, including information concerning the resident’s 
“medications, and the number of counseling sessions he attended per week; de-
tails about how the diagnosis was made; . . . and ‘details of the prescribed 
treatment moving forward[,]’ ” exceeded the information that was essential for 
the condominium association’s critical inquiries.99 
It is important to distinguish between the documentation that may be rea-
sonable to request if an individual has an apparent disability versus a disability 
that is not obvious.100 The court in Sabal Palm Condominiums of Pine Island 
Ridge Ass’n, v. Fisher found a condominium association constructively denied 
a request for a reasonable accommodation of a service dog made by a resident 
with multiple sclerosis who utilized a wheelchair.101 The Sabal Palm court 
found that the documentation the resident provided “unquestionably established 
that [the resident] was disabled within the meaning of the FHA,” and it was 
“self evident that a person with such a severe disability and with these symp-
 
Peklun v. Tierra Del Mar Condo. Ass’n, No. 15-CIV-80801-BLOOM/VALLE, 2015 WL 
8029840, at *14–15 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2015) (denying summary judgment where plaintiff 
initially provided documentation supporting dog’s status as an emotional support animal but 
later refers to the dog’s status as a service animal, acknowledging there was “a soft conflict 
between the [initial] 2011 accommodation and . . . 2013 request . . . .”). The Peklun court 
also stated “[t]he Court is unable to locate any authority that categorically precludes a hous-
ing association from requesting additional documentation supporting the request for an ac-
commodation, especially where there exists a substantial temporal disparity between the ini-
tial application and the requested update.” Id. at *12. The Peklun court continued by 
providing a hypothetical to illustrate “[c]ountless scenarios can be envisioned where a rea-
sonable accommodation is granted on the basis of a disability or handicap which is later 
eliminated through medicine, treatment, surgery, or other means.” Id. at *13. Similarly, the 
need for a second assistance animal could also support a landlord’s request for medical doc-
umentation. Grier v. Bryden Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 2:17-cv-111, 2019 WL 1046083, at *5 
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2019) (finding it was reasonable for landlord to seek medical verification 
when a tenant asserted she needed a second emotional support animal). 
96  Bone v. Vill. Club, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (M.D. Fla. 2016). 
97  Id. at 1215. 
98  Id. at 1207–08, 1215. 
99  Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2014). 
100  See infra notes 101–05 and accompanying text (discussing case where individual had 
apparent disability). 
101  Sabal Palm Condos. of Pine Island Ridge Ass’n, v. Fischer, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1277, 
1290, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
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toms” (that had been described in the medical documentation) would have dif-
ficulty with certain physical tasks.102 
In addition to medical documentation supporting the disability and its 
symptoms, the resident had also provided a letter from a dog trainer at the or-
ganization that trained the service animal detailing the tasks in which the dog 
was trained to assist the resident.103 The Sabal Palm court highlighted that the 
condominium association had not pointed to any law that required the resident 
to “point to an express statement from a healthcare provider that she needs a 
dog to assist her with her disability. That’s because there is none.”104 Instead 
the Sabal Palm court found that the documents describing the symptoms of the 
resident made it clear that a service dog trained in performing certain physical 
tasks “would help ameliorate the effects of her disability” and “she had amply 
established her disability-related need . . . .”105 
C. Issue of Interactive Process Under the FHA 
The FHA does not mandate that the housing provider engage in an interac-
tive process; however, HUD guidance states: 
[a]n interactive process in which the housing provider and the requester discuss 
the requester’s disability-related need for the requested accommodation and pos-
sible alternative accommodations is helpful to all concerned because it often re-
sults in an effective accommodation for the requester that does not pose an un-
due financial and administrative burden for the provider.106 
HUD guidance also utilizes the word “should” when referencing what a 
housing provider “should” discuss with the requester in the event a request for 
an accommodation is denied.107 
Case law has split on whether an interactive process is required under the 
FHA.108 There have been cases where courts have found that a failure to engage 
 
102  Id. at 1289. 
103  Id. at 1276–77. 
104  Id. at 1289. Such a document would support an accommodation request but is not neces-
sarily required. Id. 
105  Id. at 1290. 
106  2004 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 79, at 7. HUD answered the question, “[w]hat hap-
pens if no agreement can be reached through the interactive process?” by stating that such a 
failure is essentially a decision to not grant the requested accommodation. HUD also dis-
cussed the remedies available to the requester. See id. at 9, 14 (briefly describing the judicial 
review process available to those aggrieved). 
107  Id. at 7. The possibility of an alternative accommodation is the issue that should be dis-
cussed. If the requester’s accommodation is reasonable, a housing provider may still suggest 
an alternative accommodation; however, the individual is not required to accept such sugges-
tion. Id. at 8. 
108  See Christopher C. Ligatti, Cluttered Apartments and Complicated Tenancies: A Collab-
orative Intervention Approach to Tenant “Hoarding” Under the Fair Housing Act, 46 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 79, 89 (2013) (analyzing interactive process requirement and the FHA); 
Gretchen M. Widmer, We Can Work It Out: Reasonable Accommodation and the Interactive 
Process Under the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 761, 782 (2007) 
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in an interactive process can be an independent basis for liability for disability 
discrimination in the housing context.109 However, several courts have deter-
mined there is no duty to engage in an interactive process, or if a housing pro-
vider does not engage in such a process, such lack of action is not an independ-
ent basis for finding disability discrimination, pointing to the lack of interactive 
process language in the FHA or its implementing regulations.110 
Regardless of whether there is an independent obligation to engage in an 
interactive process, the use (or lack thereof) of such a process has been used as 
part of the court’s analysis in determining whether it was appropriate to deny 
an individual with a disability the ability to have an assistance animal in hous-
 
(discussing split in jurisdictions and arguing the FHA should be amended to specifically re-
quire housing providers to engage in an interactive process); infra notes 109–10, 112 (citing 
to recent cases discussing the issue). State laws may more clearly provide for a housing pro-
vider’s obligation to engage in such a process. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.3:2 (2017) 
(providing a person receiving an accommodation request “shall offer to engage in a good 
faith interactive process . . . .”). It is not surprising that HUD’s position is consistent with its 
guidance that a provider should engage in such a process. Administrative decisions have 
supported the imposition of an interactive process. E.g., Archibald v. Riverbay Corp., Case 
No. HUDALJ 11-F-052-FH-18, 21 (Initial Decision & Order May 7, 2012), https://www 
.hud.gov/sites/documents/HUD11-F-052-FH-18.PDF [https://perma.cc/8Q63-4FMQ] (last  
visited Feb. 19, 2020) (stating “the FHA’s statutory scheme imposes a requirement to engage 
in the interactive process to resolve requests for accommodation.”). 
109  E.g., Montano v. Bonnie Brae Convalescent Hosp., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1128 
(C.D. Cal. 2015) (stating a “Defendant’s conduct, by failing to engage in the interactive pro-
cess relating to the nature and scope of plaintiff’s requested accommodations, also consti-
tutes a violation of the FHA.”); Book v. Hunter, No. 1:12-cv-00404-CL, 2013 WL 1193865, 
at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 21, 2013) (stating the defendants “were required to engage in an interac-
tive process . . . [i]nstead, they immediately denied her application to rent, and effectively 
denied her request for reasonable accommodation.”); see also Widmer, supra note 108, at 
770 (discussing a few cases that found an interactive process essential). 
110  Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 454–
56 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting argument that, because the reasonable accommodation require-
ment parallels the Rehabilitation Act’s language, the interactive process requirement should 
also be applied); Howard v. HMK Holdings, L.L.C., No. CV 17-5701-DMG (JPRx), 2018 
WL 3642131, at *9–11 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2018) (acknowledging a split on the issue citing 
to the lack of specific language to decline to follow cases that provide for lack of engage-
ment in an interactive process as an independent basis for liability but finding the failure to 
engage in such process is a factor in determining whether there has been a failure to accom-
modate). Note the Howard case and the Montano case were both decided by the federal dis-
trict court for the central district of California. See Doe v. Hous. Auth. of Portland, No. 3:13-
cv-1974-SI, 2015 WL 758991, at *7 (D. Or. Feb. 23, 2015) (comparing the requirement of 
an interactive process in the employment context with the lack of one under the FHA); Ni-
kolich v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 870 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (following 
analysis of Lapid-Laurel case and finding no interactive process is required of municipalities 
under the FHA despite language in the 2004 Joint Statement discussed above); Rodriguez v. 
Morgan, No. CV 09-8939-GW (CWx), 2012 WL 253867, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012) 
(reviewing cases and finding that an interactive process is not a separate requirement under 
the FHA, though it can be considered as part of the determination as to whether the landlord 
has failed to grant a reasonable accommodation request). 
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ing.111 For example, in the Bone case, the district court stated “if a housing pro-
vider is skeptical about an alleged disability or its ability to provide an accom-
modation, the provider is required ‘to request documentation or open a dia-
logue’ in what is known in the ADA-context as the ‘interactive process.’ ”112 
D. Possibility of Revised Guidance 
There have been reports that HUD is planning on issuing revised guide-
lines regarding the documentation required to support a request to allow an as-
sistance animal in housing.113 Disability rights advocates expressed concerns 
 
111  See infra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing recent assistance animal cases ref-
erencing an interactive process). 
112  Bone v. Vill. Club, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1213 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (citing United 
States v. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App’x 872, 877 (11th Cir. 2011)). In the Bone case, the 
district court again referred to the interactive process in its discussion about the timing of 
granting or denying a reasonable accommodation by stating that “a housing provider is not 
permitted to ‘short-circuit’ the interactive process.” Id. at 1214 (citing to other FHA cases, 
including a case relating to the denial of a request to allow an assistance animal); see also 
Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2014) (refer-
encing the opening of a dialogue but cautioning that such dialogue does not entitle housing 
providers to request extraneous information); Carlson v. Sunshine Villas HOA, Inc., No. 
2:18-cv-1-FtM-99MRM, 2018 WL 2317820, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2018) (citing Hialeah 
Hous. Auth., 418 F. App’x. at 875) (referencing language regarding obligation of landlord to 
open a dialogue in determining the plaintiff’s allegations regarding constructive denial of her 
accommodation request were sufficient to state a claim); Nelson v. Long Reef Condo. 
Homeowners Ass’n, No. 2011-0051, 2016 WL 4154708, at *25 (D.V.I. Aug. 5, 2016) (con-
cluding that there was effective denial of request for a reasonable accommodation “by failing 
to engage in the required ‘interactive process’ to determine if the request was reasonable and 
necessary.”); Chavez v. Aber, 122 F. Supp. 3d 581, 598–99 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (discussing 
constructive denial and the interactive process); Peklun v. Tierra Del Mar Condo. Ass’n, No. 
15-CIV-80801-BLOOM/VALLE, 2015 WL 8029840, at *14–15 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2015) 
(denying summary judgment motion and reiterating a condominium association had the ob-
ligation to “open a dialogue” regarding the purpose of a purported assistance animal); Or. 
Bureau of Labor & Indus. v. Hous. Auth. of Douglas Cty., No. 6:13-cv-01205-MC, 2014 
WL 5285609, at *9–10 (D. Or. Oct. 15, 2014) (denying summary judgment motion on claim 
based on failure to engage in an interactive process). 
113  Roberto C. Blanch, HUD Expected to Issue Revised Guidance on Requests for Emotional 
Support Animals, FLA. HOA LAW. BLOG (May 25, 2018), https://www.floridahoalawyer 
blog.com/hud-expected-to-issue-revised-guidance-on-requests-for-emotional-support-ani 
mals/#more-1381 [https://perma.cc/Q8EQ-PXUB] (quoting Senior Policy Representative  
Megan Booth) (reporting that a representative of the National Association of Realtors stated 
“HUD is willing to put a caveat [into their guidelines] that tenants must have a letter from a 
licensed health care provider that they have a demonstrated ongoing professional relation-
ship with, not just on the internet . . . .” (alteration in original)). The revised guidelines were 
expected later in 2018. Id.; see also Rachel M. Cohen, Donald Trump’s Civil Rights Office 
for Housing Has Found the Real Problem: Pets, INTERCEPT (Mar. 23, 2018, 6:51 AM), 
[hereinafter Cohen, Real Problem], https://theintercept.com/2018/03/23/emotional-support- 
animals-housing-law/ [https://perma.cc/NN5T-UY4V] (reporting that HUD had meetings  
with representatives of housing industry groups but not fair housing and disability rights 
groups to discuss verification regarding assistance animals). The Cohen article also reported 
that “HUD may issue new guidance restricting access to emotional support animals as early 
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that they had not been allowed to provide input on new guidance.114 At least 
one meeting between HUD officials and disability rights advocates was sched-
uled and cancelled in the summer of 2018.115 However, HUD did meet with 
disability rights advocates in October of 2018.116 There have been reports that 
HUD has been circulating draft guidance to other federal agencies for re-
view.117 In contrast, new regulations have been proposed that would change the 
obligations of air carriers under the ACAA.118 
III. AIR CARRIER ACCESS ACT119 
Aircraft transportation is specifically excluded in the definition of the type 
of transportation covered by the ADA.120 However, the ACAA provides similar 
 
as the beginning of April [2018].” Id. However, a spokesperson for HUD declined to com-
ment on any plans to issue further guidance. Id.; see also Rachel M. Cohen, A Federal Civil 
Rights Office Wants to Limit Access to Emotional-Support Animals that Can Help with De-
pression, INTERCEPT (Mar. 19, 2019, 5:30 AM) [hereinafter Cohen, Limit Access], 
https://theintercept.com/2019/03/18/hud-emotional-support-animal/ [https://perma.cc/X36Y- 
CZCS] (reporting that HUD met with disability rights advocates in October 2018, and HUD 
was submitting proposed guidance to other federal agencies for review). 
114  Letter from Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities et al. to Paul Compton, Gen. Counsel, 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., and Anna Maria Farias, Assistant Sec’y for Fair Hous. &  
Equal Opportunity, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (May 14, 2018) (available at https://www. 
aapd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2018-05-14-Fair-Housing-and-Disability-Rights-Org 
-Letter-to-HUD-re-RA-Ve.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BK2-GLZR]) (requesting a meeting be 
tween fair housing and disability rights organizations and HUD staff involved in any consid-
eration of HUD guidance relating to assistance animals and stating “[w]e are aware that 
apartment management and real estate industry representatives have met with HUD in recent 
months to specifically discuss reasonable accommodation verification matters.”). 
115  Letter from Neil Romano, Chairman of the Nat’l Council on Disability, to Anna Maria 
Farias, Assistant Sec’y for Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. 
(July 12, 2018) (available at https://ncd.gov/publications/2018/letter-hud-assistant-secretary-
farias-urging-meeting-proposed-revisions-guidance [https://perma.cc/666E-UW7P]) (writing  
on behalf of the “independent, nonpartisan federal agency[,]” the National Council on Disa-
bility, urging Assistant Secretary Farias to reschedule a meeting with disability rights advo-
cates that had been scheduled for June 11, 2018, but had been cancelled). The National 
Council on Disability letter also offered to meet separately from disability rights advocates 
in its role “as a sister federal agency” but encouraged HUD to meet with disability organiza-
tions regarding proposed revisions to assistance animal guidance. Id. 
116  Cohen, Limit Access, supra note 113. 
117  Id. Disability rights advocates are reportedly considering ways to challenge any new 
HUD guidance that could be inconsistent with the FHA and its regulations. Id. 
118  See infra Section III.E (describing proposed rulemaking process). 
119  49 U.S.C. § 41705(a) (2018). Although generally referred to as the Air Carrier Access 
Act, the official title of the legislation is Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air 
Travel. 14 C.F.R. § 382 (2019). 
120  42 U.S.C. § 12141(2) (2018). Air terminals are covered by the ADA. 14 C.F.R. § 382.51 
(2019) (setting forth the rules applicable to carriers for terminal facilities under their con-
trol); see also Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,832, 23,834 (May 23, 
2018) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382) (stating the DOJ’s Title II rules “govern airports 
owned by . . . public entit[ies]” while the DOJ’s Title III rules govern privately owned air-
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protection by prohibiting air carriers from discriminating against persons with 
disabilities.121 There has been considerable media attention on purported fraud 
and conflict arising out of service and emotional support animals traveling with 
airline passengers.122 In early 2018, Delta Airlines announced changes to its 
service animal policy that increased the documentation required for passengers 
traveling with service animals.123 Other airlines followed by amending their 
own policies.124 In its announcement, Delta Airlines reported that since 2016 
there had been an 84 percent increase in reported incidents involving ani-
mals.125 There was swift reaction by disability rights activists concerned with 
the impact of the changes on persons with disabilities.126 This Part of the Arti-
 
ports and facilities); 2009 Final Rule, supra note 8, at 27,636 (discussing the application of 
“Title III rules for places of public accommodation” applying to airport concessions, stating 
the DOJ rule would allow these entities to accept an emotional support animal, and urging 
“all parties at airports to be aware that their services and facilities are intended to serve all 
passengers.”). 
121  49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2018) (prohibiting discrimination against an otherwise-qualified in-
dividual if the “individual has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities.”). A qualified individual is essentially a passenger with a ticket 
who meets the other contract of carriage requirements that are applied to all passengers. 14 
C.F.R. § 382.3 (2019). 
122  David Heffernan, ‘Comfort Animals’ Do Not Belong in an Aircraft Cabin; Regulators 
May Act Soon to Address the Problem, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2018, 2:38 PM), https://www.forb 
es.com/sites/davidheffernan1/2018/11/13/comfort-animals-do-not-belong-in-an-aircraft-cab 
in-regulators-may-act-soon-to-address-the-problem/#2087d0034aba [https://perma.cc/HB65-
BMEF] (discussing proposed rulemaking and issues involving fraud and passengers attempt-
ing to fly with exotic animals); Mark Osborne, Airline Passenger Punches Deaf Pregnant 
Woman, Service Dog: Police, ABC NEWS (May 19, 2018, 2:20 AM), https://abcnews.go.com 
/beta-story-container/US/airline-passenger-punches-deaf-pregnant-woman-service-dog/st 
ory?id=55279503 [https://perma.cc/HK3E-RZQ9] (describing altercation involving passen-
ger traveling with a service dog and another passenger). 
123  Delta Introduces Enhanced Requirements for Customers Traveling with Service or Sup-
port Animals Effective March 1, DELTA NEWS HUB: BUSINESS, [hereinafter Delta Introduc-
es], https://news.delta.com/delta-introduces-enhanced-requirements-customers-traveling-serv 
ice-or-support-animals-effective [https://perma.cc/LW23-HUWN] (last visited Feb. 19,  
2020); Allison Prang & Doug Cameron, Delta to Require Advance Documentation for Ser-
vice, Support Animals to Fly, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2018, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/delta-to-require-advance-proof-of-need-for-service-support-an 
imals-to-fly-1516372227 [https://perma.cc/3P4Y-JA5M] (reporting on Delta’s announce-
ment). 
124  Bart Jansen, Following Peacock Fiasco, United Airlines Tightens Policy for Comfort An-
imals, USA TODAY (Feb. 1, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/2018/02 
/01/united-joins-delta-updating-policies-deal-flood-comfort-animals/1086683001/ [https://pe 
rma.cc/RB4G-FUDG] (reporting that the number of “comfort animals” flying on United in-
creased from 43,000 to 76,000 from 2016 to 2017 and that there was “a significant increase 
in onboard incidents.”).  
125  Delta Introduces, supra note 123 (citing to increase in incidents as rationale for change 
in policy). 
126  See American Airlines Announces Changes to Emotional Support Animal Policy, AM. 
AIRLINES NEWSROOM (May 14, 2018, 10:00 AM), news.aa.com/news/news-details/2018/A 
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cle provides some background on the law applicable to air carriers and analyzes 
the rulemaking process.127 
A. 2009 ACAA Regulations 
The Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for establishing 
the regulations and enforcing the ACAA.128 The regulations in place at the be-
ginning of 2018 became effective in May 2009 (the “2009 ACAA Regula-
tions”).129 The 2009 ACAA Regulations require air carriers to permit service 
animals to accompany passengers with disabilities, even if it “may offend or 
annoy carrier personnel or persons traveling on the aircraft.”130 Although air 
carriers are not required to accommodate “certain unusual” animals, some other 
animals—such as miniature horses, pigs, and monkeys—may need to be ac-
commodated.131 DOT guidance to the 2009 ACAA Regulations provides “[a] 
single passenger may have two or more service animals.”132 
Air carriers can refuse to accommodate service animals, including dogs, if 
certain factors would “preclude their traveling in the cabin as service ani-
mals.”133 These factors include “whether the animal is too large or heavy to be 
accommodated in the cabin, whether the animal would pose a direct threat to 
 
merican-Airlines-Announces-Changes-to-Emotional-Support-Animal-Policy/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/UB6T-NZUB] (announcing American Airlines will limit the species of 
ESAs and will enforce the forty-eight-hour advance notice provision except in cases of 
emergency); We Update Our Policy Around Emotional Support Animals, UNITED AIRLINES 
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://hub.united.com/united-emotional-suppport-animal-policy-2530539164 
.html [https://perma.cc/FPL5-EPMJ] (adding a documentation requirement to fly on United 
Airlines regarding the training and health status for ESAs but not making changes to re-
quirements for service animals); Lauren Zumbach, Southwest Joins Airlines Cracking Down 
on Emotional Support Animals, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com 
/business/ct-biz-southwest-airlines-emotional-support-animal-restrictions-20180814-
story.html [https://perma.cc/YK4A-T3TF] (discussing Southwest’s new policy limiting the 
species of ESAs to dogs and cats and requiring the animal to be on leash or in a carrier). 
127  See infra Part III (discussing issues relating to the Air Carrier Access Act). 
128  Traveling with a Disability, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/indivi 
duals/aviation-consumer-protection/traveling-disability [https://perma.cc/6D5C-T5SJ] (last  
visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
129  14 C.F.R. § 382.1 (2019) (describing the purpose of the rules and stating an effective 
date of May 13, 2009); see also Huss, Context, supra note 24, at 1203–08 (discussing the 
ACAA regulations and the reaction to those regulations). 
130  14 C.F.R. § 382.117(a). 
131  Id. § 382.117(f). The “certain unusual” animals that do not need to be accommodated 
include spiders, rodents, and reptiles. Id. In the guidance published with the 2009 regula-
tions, the DOT downplayed the impact of passengers requesting to bring unusual service an-
imals onto flights (“[b]ecause they make for colorful stories, accounts of unusual service an-
imals have received publicity wholly disproportionate to their frequency or importance. 
Some (e.g., tales of service snakes, which grow larger with each retelling) have become the 
stuff of urban legends”). 2009 Final Rule, supra note 8, at 27,636. 
132  Id. at 27,661. 
133  14 C.F.R. § 382.117(f). 
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the health or safety or others, [or] whether it would cause a significant disrup-
tion of cabin service . . . .”134 
Although direct threat and disruption are not further defined in the 2009 
ACAA regulations, material produced by the DOT explains that if an animal is 
“barking or snarling, running around, and/or jumping onto other passengers, 
etc.[,] without being provoked,” the air carrier can refuse to accept the service 
animal.135 DOT guidance published in 2009 also states that if an air carrier de-
termines, because of behavioral issues, “a service animal cannot accompany a 
passenger[,]” before excluding the animal from the cabin, “[t]he carrier should 
first permit the passenger to try available means of mitigating the problem (e.g., 
muzzling a barking service dog).”136 
The 2009 ACAA Regulations distinguish between service animals assisting 
persons with physical disabilities and service animals assisting persons with 
psychiatric disabilities.137 Psychiatric service animals (PSAs) and emotional 
support animals (ESAs) are treated as one category, with “service animals” 
(e.g., animals assisting persons with other disabilities) treated as a separate cat-
egory.138 
For service animals, the evidence that an air carrier must accept to allow 
the animal on the flight includes “identification cards, other written documenta-
tion, presence of harnesses, tags, or the credible verbal assurances” of the indi-
vidual with the animal.139 Air carriers may require persons traveling with ESAs 
or PSAs to provide documentation no older than a year from the date of the ini-
tial flight, on “letterhead [from] a licensed mental health professional” stating: 
(1) The passenger has a mental or emotional disability recognized in the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—Fourth Edition (DSM 
IV); 
(2) The passenger needs the emotional support or psychiatric service animal as 
an accommodation for air travel and/or for activity at the passenger’s desti-
nation; 
(3) The individual providing the assessment is a licensed mental health profes-
sional, and the passenger is under his or her professional care; and 
 
134  Id. Another factor is whether the animal would not be allowed to “enter[] a foreign coun-
try [if] that is the flight’s destination.” Id. 
135  Service Animals (Including Emotional Support Animals), U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., https: 
//www.transportation.gov/individuals/aviation-consumer-protection/service-animals-incl 
uding-emotional-support-animals [https://perma.cc/KV9R-7VTD] (last visited Feb. 19,  
2020). 
136  Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Air Travel of People with Disabili-
ties Under the Amended Air Carrier Access Act Regulation, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., 15 (May 
13, 2009), [hereinafter ACAA 2009 Answers], https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov 
/files/docs/FAQ_5_13_09_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LNE-K9H8]. 
137  14 C.F.R. § 382.117(d)–(e). 
138  See id. 
139  Id. § 382.117(d) (emphasis added). 
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(4) The date and type of the mental health professional’s license and the state or 
other jurisdiction in which it was issued.140 
The 2009 ACAA Regulations provide that passengers with ESAs or PSAs 
(but not other service animals) may be required to provide up to forty-eight 
hours advance notice to the air carrier and check in earlier than the general pub-
lic if they intend to travel with such animals.141 
These regulations also provide that passengers cannot be required to sign a 
release or waiver of liability “for the loss of, death of, or injury to service ani-
mals,”142 and there are other requirements regarding transportation of service 
animals not relating to documentation, such as seat assignments.143 If an air car-
rier does not allow a service animal to accompany a passenger, it is required to 
document the decision in writing and provide the rationale to the passenger.144 
B. Selected Activity Relating to the ACAA Between 2009 and 2016 
In September 2009, the DOT published a request for comments on a peti-
tion for rulemaking in response to a request by the Psychiatric Service Dog So-
ciety (PSDS) for the DOT to eliminate the provision in the 2009 ACAA Regu-
lations allowing air carriers to require documentation and advance notice for 
PSAs.145 The DOT publication and petition illustrates some of the arguments 
made by disability rights advocates who are opposed to distinguishing between 
service animals used by persons with physical disabilities and service animals 
 
140  Id. § 382.117(e). The types of licensed mental health professionals consist of “psychia-
trist, psychologist, licensed clinical social worker, including a medical doctor specifically 
treating the passenger’s mental or emotional disability . . . .” Id. 
141  Id. § 382.27(c). Passengers traveling with emotional support animals or psychiatric ser-
vice animals may be required to check in one hour before the general public. Id. If a flight 
segment is scheduled to take eight hours or more, advance notice may be required for service 
animals. Id. § 382.27(c)(9). 
142  Id. § 382.35(b). 
143  Id. §§ 382.51(a)(5), 382.81(c), 382.91(c), 382.117(a)–(c) (providing for options for seat 
assignments, assistance in toileting an animal at an animal relief area at the airport, and al-
lowing carriers to require documentation relating to toileting if a flight segment is over eight 
hours). 
144  Id. § 382.117(g). The documentation must be provided to the passenger within ten calen-
dar days if not provided at the airport at the time the decision was made. Id.; see also infra 
notes 216–20 and accompanying text (discussing the controversy over whether there is a pri-
vate right of action under the ACAA). 
145  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 74 Fed. Reg. 47,902 (Sept. 
18, 2009) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382) [hereinafter 2009 Petition for Rulemaking]. 
“[A]ny person may file a petition to . . . amend . . . a rule” under the DOT’s regulatory pro-
cedures. Id. at 49,904. This petition was one of the rationales for the proposed rulemaking in 
2018. See infra note 237 and accompanying text. 
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used by persons with psychiatric disabilities.146 It also provides insight into the 
possible counterarguments or questions that arise from such arguments.147 
The first argument is that service animals, whether accompanied by per-
sons with physical or psychiatric disabilities, are trained and have handler-
specific behaviors to mitigate an individual’s disability.148 In contrast, ESAs 
require “little or no training.”149 The DOT asked whether there was a clear dis-
tinction between PSAs and ESAs, given that any animal can be excluded if the 
animal is exhibiting behavior that is disruptive or a direct threat, it appears that 
some PSAs provide emotional support, and some people say their ESAs per-
form specific physical tasks for them.150 
The PSDS petition also raised concerns over the ability of airlines to re-
quire forty-eight hours advance notice for persons who are traveling on short 
notice, such as a personal or family emergency.151 The DOT queried whether 
its guidance, set forth below, was sufficient to address this problem—or if in 
fact there were actual problems implementing it.152 
Carriers must accommodate a passenger accompanied by an emotional support 
or psychiatric service animal who has not provided [forty-eight] hours’ advance 
notice if the carrier can do so by making reasonable efforts, without delaying a 
flight. The carrier, at its discretion, may waive its [forty-eight] hours’ advance 
notice requirement in order to expedite the emergency air travel of a passenger 
accompanied by an emotional support or psychiatric service animal.153 
PSDS also asserted that requiring the documentation for PSAs stigmatizes 
individuals with mental-health-related disabilities.154 The PSDS petition argued 
that if it is necessary for persons with PSAs to provide documentation, persons 
with service animals should have similar requirements.155 
Other arguments related to the documentation requirement itself.156 PSDS 
raised concerns about medical privacy, both that individuals are required to dis-
close confidential medical information and that there is no provision specifying 
how the air carriers are to keep such information confidential.157 The DOT has 
 
146  See infra notes 148–150 and accompanying text (discussing arguments). 
147  2009 Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 145, at 47,904–06 (discussing petition and 
questions). The DOT was clear that although it was seeking comments on the petition, the 
department had no obligation to make any changes to the regulations. Id. at 47,904–06. 
148  Id. at 47,904. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. at 47,905. 
151  Id. at 47,904. 
152  Id. at 47,906; ACAA 2009 Answers, supra note 136, at 4–5. 
153  2009 Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 145, at 47,906; ACAA 2009 Answers, supra 
note 136, at 4–5. 
154  2009 Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 145, at 47,904. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. 
20 NEV. L.J. 785 
Spring 2020] PUPS, PAPERWORK, AND PROCESS 813 
issued guidance on the keeping of such information; however, it is very general 
and not in the regulation itself.158 
PSDS raised concerns over possible challenges associated with obtaining 
the required documentation, including financial hardship (especially if an indi-
vidual does not have medical insurance).159 The DOT asked for comments 
about whether this is a concern and pointed to guidance that encourages airlines 
to accept documentation that is more than one year old if the passenger pro-
vides written proof indicating that he or she no longer has health insurance or 
cannot otherwise afford treatment.160 
The PSDS contended that the DOT did not have “adequate evidence that 
there is a problem with people trying to sneak pets aboard,” although it did rec-
ognize it would be easy for someone to “cheat” the system by claiming a PSA 
actually was a service animal assisting with a physical disability, and thus not 
subject to the documentation requirements.161 The DOT asked for comments 
from airlines and others addressing whether there was evidence supporting the 
need for a procedural requirement at all.162 The DOT indicated it was open to 
identifying alternative ways to prevent fraud, and it stated that the DOT, “the 
service animal community . . . , and the airlines all share the goal of stopping 
the abuse of service animal access rights by passengers who fraudulently assert 
that their pets are service animals.”163 
The regulations requiring documentation and advance notice for PSAs and 
ESAs remained in place after the comment period relating to this petition end-
ed, with the DOT stating in the request for comments in the petition for rule-
making it did not “believe that immediate action to change the final rule would 
be prudent prior to an opportunity to review comments on issues concerning 
which a wide variety of parties may have an interest in.”164  And in July 2012, 
the DOT published a Draft Technical Assistance Manual (Draft TAM).165 This 
draft manual was not ultimately adopted by the DOT, but the guidance provid-
ed therein is illustrative of the likely viewpoint of the DOT at the time.166 The 
 
158  Id. at 47,905; ACAA 2009 Answers, supra note 136, at 4 (stating the DOT recommends 
“airlines not retain personal medical information that they require a passenger to provide as a 
condition for obtaining disability accommodations,” but that if they retain the information, it 
recommends airlines “take steps to safeguard it (e.g., maintaining the information in a sepa-
rate confidential file for as long as they retain the passenger’s reservation records for the 
flights involved).”). 
159  2009 Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 145, at 47,904. 
160  Id. at 47,906; ACAA 2009 Answers, supra note 136, at 16. 
161  2009 Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 145, at 47,904. 
162  Id. at 47,905. 
163  Id. 
164  Id. at 47,904. 
165  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel: Draft Technical Assistance 
Manual, 77 Fed. Reg. 39,800 (July 5, 2012) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382) [hereinafter 
Draft TAM]. 
166  Id.; see also Air Travelers with Disabilities: Technical Assistance Manual for Airline 
Employees, Contractors, and Travelers, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.transportation.go 
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purpose of the Draft TAM was not to establish new requirements, but to assist 
airlines in their compliance with the ACAA.167 The language in the Draft TAM 
paralleled the language of a 2005-adopted Technical Assistance Manual in 
most respects.168 The Draft TAM included a new section addressing unusual 
service animals and also reiterated that foreign carriers had the ability to limit 
the species of accommodated service animals to dogs in certain circumstanc-
es.169 Of particular relevance to this Article, the verification and documentation 
requirements discussed in the Draft TAM were consistent with the 2009 ACAA 
Regulations.170 
C. Failed Negotiated Rulemaking Process in 2016 
A negotiated rulemaking process utilizing a committee (commonly referred 
to as Reg-Neg) is viewed as a more collaborative method to establish regula-
tions compared with a traditional notice-and-comment process.171 Agencies de-
termine whether a Reg-Neg process is appropriate utilizing several factors, in-
cluding whether “there is a reasonable likelihood that a committee will reach a 
consensus on the proposed rule” and whether the “committee can be convened 
with a balanced representation of persons . . . .”172 Potential benefits to stake-
holders of rules developed through a Reg-Neg process can include fewer ad-
 
v/airconsumer/air-travelers-disabilities-technical-assistance-manual-airline-employees 
[https://perma.cc/G3PB-U2WM] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020) (providing link to 2005 Tech-
nical Assistance Manual and stating it is a guide to the ACAA and its implementing regula-
tions). The 2005 Technical Assistance Manual includes general advice regarding interacting 
with persons with disabilities and their service animals. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of 
Disability: Technical Assistance Manual, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,482, 41,485 (July 19, 2005) (to be 
codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382) [hereinafter 2005 TAM]. 
167  Draft TAM, supra note 165, at 39,800. 
168  Compare id., at 39,813–14, with 2005 TAM, supra note 166, at 41,491–92 (providing 
similar language). 
169  Draft TAM, supra note 165, at 39,815 (providing that foreign carriers on code sharing 
flights with U.S. carriers could not restrict the species in this manner). 
170  Id. at 39,814. 
171  Administrative Conference Recommendation 2017-2: Negotiated Rulemaking and Other 
Options for Public Engagement, Admin. Conf. of the United States (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/negotiated-rulemaking-and-other-options-public-
engagement [https://perma.cc/H9BT-N3SX] (discussing the adversarial nature of notice-and-
comment rulemaking); Jill Laptosky & Judith Kaleta, The Pleasures and Pitfalls of Negoti-
ated Rulemaking, AM. BAR ASSOC. 1–3, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ad 
ministrative/air_space/course/16-update/uc16-reg-pleasures-and-pitfalls-negotiated-rulema 
king.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG8L-5VMQ] (last visited Feb. 27, 2020) (discussing the Reg-
Neg process including the use of the process at the Department of Transportation). 
172  5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(3)–(4) (2018). “[T]here are a limited number of identifiable interests,” 
and there is an expectation that the process can be done in a timely manner in a way that will 
result in the agency being able to use the consensus of the committee as its proposed rule. Id. 
§ 563(a)(2). 
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verse comments during the proposed rulemaking comment period and greater 
satisfaction with the final rule.173 
In late 2015, the DOT announced its intent to consider a Reg-Neg for six 
issues relating to air travel for persons with disabilities.174 The DOT described 
the Reg-Neg process as working with representatives of interested parties and 
the agency to reach a consensus on specified issues.175 For issues on which the 
advisory committee reached a consensus, the DOT would then issue a proposed 
rule for public comment based on that consensus.176 
After a public comment period, and the hiring of a neutral convener who 
prepared a report on the feasibility of conducting a Reg-Neg for the identified 
issues, the DOT established a committee to consider three of the issues, includ-
ing “whether to amend the definition of ‘service animals’ that may accompany 
passengers with a disability on a flight.”177 In regards to utilizing the Reg-Neg 
process on the service animal issue, the DOT stated “[c]oncerns expressed 
across interest groups about service animals on aircraft suggested that stake-
holders would be motivated to come to agreement on their recommenda-
tions.”178 
The committee that was established for the Reg-Neg process was referred 
to as the ACCESS Advisory Committee.179 Of the twenty-seven members of 
the ACCESS Advisory Committee, nineteen committee members identified 
themselves as having a stakeholder or expert interest in service animal is-
sues.180 There were seven plenary meetings of the ACCESS Advisory Commit-
tee beginning in May 2016 and ending in November 2016, although issues re-
lating to service animals were not discussed at the final two meetings.181 
 
173  Laptosky & Kaleta, supra note 171, at 6 (discussing possible benefits of Reg-Neg). 
174  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel; Consideration of Negotiated 
Rulemaking Process, 80 Fed. Reg. 75,953, 75,953–54 (Dec. 7, 2015) (to be codified at 14 
C.F.R. pt. 382) [hereinafter Consideration of Negotiated Rulemaking Process]; see also 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel; Establishment of a Negotiated 
Rulemaking Committee, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,265, 20,266 (Apr. 7, 2016) (to be codified at 14 
C.F.R. pt. 382) [hereinafter Establishment of a Negotiated Rulemaking Committee] (discuss-
ing background to formation of committee). 
175  Consideration of Negotiated Rulemaking Process, supra note 174, at 75,954. 
176  Id. at 75,954–55. The issuance and public comment process would be “under established 
rulemaking procedures.” Id. 
177  Establishment of a Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, supra note 174, at 20,265. In ad-
dition to the service animal issue, the committee was to consider accessibility of inflight en-
tertainment and other communication as well as issues relating to accessible lavatories on 
certain planes. Id. 
178  Id. at 20,266. In contrast, the differences among stakeholders relating to inflight enter-
tainment were greater, and the accessible lavatory issue was referenced as “perhaps the long-
est standing and the most controversial” of the three issues. Id. 
179  Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,832, 23,835–36 (May 23, 2018) 
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 362) (discussing the establishment of the Advisory Commit-
tee on Accessible Air Transportation—referred to as the ACCESS Advisory Committee). 
180  Id. at 23,836. These committee members were identified as working on these issues. Id. 
181  ACCESS Advisory Committee, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/ 
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1. Advocates’ Positions 
During the Reg-Neg process, committee members who are advocates for 
persons with disabilities provided a proposal for consideration.182 The initial 
proposal recommended the adoption of a mechanism that provided a decision 
tree to have passengers engage with the idea that such a process “is intended 
both to remedy ignorance and to ultimately be executed in a way that is easy to 
agree to for those who are doing the right thing, but might be imposing and dis-
suade those who aren’t.”183 “[N]o other documentation would be required” if 
the decision-tree process resulted in a passenger determining he or she was 
traveling with a service animal or emotional support animal, with the passenger 
attesting to the truth of the statements and acknowledging that it is fraudulent to 
make false statements in order to obtain the accommodation.184 
The service animal category only included dogs “trained to behave proper-
ly in [a] public setting[]” and “trained to do work or perform a task to mitigate 
a person’s disability on the flight or at the destination[.]”185 Miniature horses 
and capuchin monkeys might also be granted access, though they were not in-
cluded in the service animal definition.186 
The advocates also set forth a “behavior standard” for public access, which 
included being housetrained, generally controlled, and not disruptive or de-
structive.187 Service animals in training would be allowed to travel as if they 
were service animals if they meet the behavior standard for public access.188 
 
access-advisory-committee [https://perma.cc/EZP5-ZQA7] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020)  
(providing information on and links to documents relating to the Reg-Neg process and the 
activities of the committee). The minutes of the final two meetings do not reflect any activity 
relating to service animals. See U.S. Dep’t. Transp. Minutes: Seventh Meeting of the DOT 
ACCESS Committee (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/doc 
s/resources/individuals/aviation-consumer-protection/285906/november-meeting-
minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZE9A-8X8H]; U.S. Dep’t. Transp., Minutes: Sixth Meeting of 
the DOT ACCESS Committee (Oct. 12–14, 2016), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot 
.gov/files/docs/resources/individuals/aviation-consumer-protection/285901/october-meeting-
minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T5C-2DMW]. 
182  See U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., ADVOCATES’ SERVICE ANIMAL PROPOSAL 1 (2016) [hereinafter 
ADVOCATES’ SERVICE ANIMAL PROPOSAL]. 
183  Id. 
184  Id. at 2, 10. 
185  Id. at 2. 
186  Id. at 3–4. Miniature horses would essentially be treated under the same standards as 
dogs, but capuchin monkeys would be “restricted to pet carriers while traveling” because 
“[t]hey are exclusively used for residential disability mitigation and are not intended to assist 
their users in public settings.” Id. at 4. 
187  Id. at 2. In addition, the dog cannot create “a threat to health or safety[,]” by aggressive 
behavior or otherwise, should not be placed on the seat, and should “not unduly encroach[] 
on another passenger’s space without permission.” Id. at 3. 
188  Id. at 4. 
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ESAs, including dogs and other species, would continue to need to be ac-
commodated.189 Dogs not trained to meet the public access behavior standard—
as well as all other species—would have to be transported in a pet carrier.190 
Airlines would continue to have the ability to apply factors such as size or 
weight that would preclude the animal from traveling in the cabin.191 Under the 
proposal, airlines could also require a passenger to provide a “reasonable justi-
fication” if traveling with more than two animals.192 
Subsequent documentation indicated that there was not unanimous support 
for the positions initially proposed by the advocates.193 Some advocates sup-
ported the concession to restrict the species that could qualify as service ani-
mals to dogs (with exceptions for miniature horses and capuchin monkeys) 
with the understanding that the issue would be revisited in the future.194 Other 
advocates would include cats as allowable species of service animals, arguing 
that there is no “evidence that service cats present a safety risk in air travel 
[thus] there is no justification for removing access.”195 
The advocates also disagreed on whether the species of ESAs should be re-
stricted. One group agreed that ESAs should be limited to dogs and cats, with 
the default rule that the animals would be contained in a pet carrier.196 A sec-
ond group argued ESAs should be limited to dogs, cats, and rabbits, with the 
default rule that the ESA must be contained in a pet carrier.197 A third group of 
advocates would also allow ESAs who are household birds, with birds and rab-
 
189  Id. at 3. 
190  Id. 
191  Id. at 4. 
192  Id. at 4–5. The two animals can both be service animals, ESAs, or a combination of the 
two categories of animals. Id. at 4. 
193  See generally U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., SERVICE ANIMAL ADVOCATE POSITIONS AND 
REASONING 1 (2016) [hereinafter SERVICE ANIMAL ADVOCATE POSITIONS AND REASONING]; 
U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., ADVOCATE SERVICE ANIMAL PROPOSAL ADDENDUM 1–4 (2016) [herein-
after ADDENDUM]. 
194  SERVICE ANIMAL ADVOCATE POSITIONS AND REASONING, supra note 193, at 1; 
ADDENDUM, supra note 193, at 1. 
195  SERVICE ANIMAL ADVOCATE POSITIONS AND REASONING, supra note 193, at 6 (quoting 
section of report discussing the low safety risk of cats and including them in the species of 
service animals); ADDENDUM, supra note 193, at 1 (setting forth cats as an additional service 
animal species). 
196  SERVICE ANIMAL ADVOCATE POSITIONS AND REASONING, supra note 193, at 15. At one 
point, there was agreement among the advocates that ESA dogs with public access training 
would not be confined to a carrier. ADDENDUM, supra note 193, at 2. The concession of 
some advocates to limit the species of ESAs to dogs and cats came later in the process with 
the Addendum still listing other species as qualifying for inclusion in the ESA category. Id. 
197  SERVICE ANIMAL ADVOCATE POSITIONS AND REASONING, supra note 193, at 7. If the 
ESA is needed for disability mitigation during the flight, the ESA can be out of the carrier so 
long as the ESA comports to the behavior standard for public access. Id.; ADDENDUM, supra 
note 193, at 2. The group of advocates who did not support including rabbits expressed con-
cern about the unpredictability of rabbits’ behavior and the potential impact on the other an-
imals most likely to be traveling (cats and dogs). SERVICE ANIMAL ADVOCATE POSITIONS 
AND REASONING, supra note 193, at 15–16. 
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bits restricted to a pet carrier during the flight.198 Dogs and cats serving as 
ESAs who have been trained for public access would not be restricted to a pet 
carrier.199 How the decision-tree process would work, including the mandatory 
and voluntary nature of the process, also resulted in three-way split of opinion 
among the advocates.200 
2. Air Carriers’ Positions 
The carriers’ initial response to the advocates’ service animal proposal did 
not reject the decision-tree documentation concept as a whole, but a later re-
sponse indicated that some of the carriers were not supportive of the concept 
because of the reliance on passenger-generated (compared with third-party) 
documentation.201 The carriers also were unable to support a voluntary (versus 
mandatory) documentation approach.202 
The carriers’ position was that the service animal species should be limited 
to “dogs, capuchin monkey [in carriers through flight] and, under certain cir-
cumstances, miniature horses” and rejected the addition of cats to the list of al-
lowed species.203 The carriers would prefer to eliminate the requirement that 
they are required to accommodate passengers with ESAs.204 The carriers pro-
posed that the approach of the ADA (not requiring the accommodation of per-
sons with ESAs) should be applied to the ACAA.205 
The carriers also had issues with the timing of the submission of the docu-
mentation.206 The carriers objected to how the current forty-eight-hour advance 
 
198  SERVICE ANIMAL ADVOCATE POSITIONS AND REASONING, supra note 193, at 12. 
199  Id. At one point the advocates proposed that all ESA cats would be confined to carriers. 
ADDENDUM, supra note 193, at 2 (providing for cats to be confined to a carrier unless needed 
for disability mitigation during flight). 
200  SERVICE ANIMAL ADVOCATE POSITIONS AND REASONING, supra note 193, at 16–27 (indi-
cating a three-way split of opinion); ADDENDUM, supra note 193, at 2–3 (indicating a two- or 
three-way split of opinion). 
201  U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., CARRIER RESPONSE TO ADVOCATES’ SERVICE ANIMAL PROPOSAL 1 
(2016) [hereinafter CARRIER RESPONSE]; U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., CARRIER RESPONSE TO 
REVISED SERVICE ANIMAL PROPOSAL 1 (2016) [hereinafter CARRIER RESPONSE TO REVISED 
SERVICE ANIMAL PROPOSAL]. 
202  CARRIER RESPONSE TO REVISED SERVICE ANIMAL PROPOSAL, supra note 201, at 1. 
203  Id. at 3. The carriers referenced documentation that service animals are restricted to dogs 
in other countries. CARRIER RESPONSE, supra note 201, at 1. 
204  CARRIER RESPONSE, supra note 201, at 2 (stating “[b]ottom line: the ESA aspect of the 
SAP is unacceptable to the carriers. It would exacerbate the entire ESA problem rather than 
mitigate it.”); CARRIER RESPONSE TO REVISED SERVICE ANIMAL PROPOSAL, supra note 201, at 
2–3. 
205  CARRIER RESPONSE, supra note 201, at 2; CARRIER RESPONSE TO REVISED SERVICE 
ANIMAL PROPOSAL, supra note 201, at 2–3. In their initial response, the carriers stated that, 
although it would make carrier agreement less likely, “at a minimum[, the ESA] provision 
should have the same species limits as applies to service animals, and the ESA should be 
required to remain in a pet carrier during flight.” CARRIER RESPONSE, supra note 201, at 2. 
206  CARRIER RESPONSE, supra note 201, at 3 (initially stating “[p]assengers must complete 
the documentation at the time of ticketing absent some compelling reason not to . . . .”); 
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notice rule has been interpreted to allow for exceptions to be made, arguing that 
documentation should be provided a minimum of twelve hours prior to the 
flight.207 The carriers also proposed a limit of two service animals for each pas-
senger, with a requirement that a passenger traveling “with more than one ser-
vice animal may be required to provide ‘reasonable justification’ to the airline 
[to support] the need to do so.”208 Given the divergent viewpoints of the advo-
cates and carriers it is not surprising that, unlike the other two issues it was 
considering, the ACCESS Advisory Committee was unable to reach consensus 
on the service animal issue.209 
D. Selected Legislative Activities in 2017 and 2018 
In 2017 and 2018 there were multiple pieces of legislation introduced to 
address the issue of service animals under the ACAA.210 The Air Carrier Ac-
cess Amendments Act (ACAAA) was introduced in 2017211 and 2018212 by 
members of the Senate and House of Representatives respectively.213 The 
ACAAA included congressional findings that individuals with disabilities con-
tinue to encounter significant barriers including “inequitable treatment of ser-
vice animals[.]”214 
The ACAAA would have provided that the Secretary of the DOT would be 
required to “issue revised regulations—(A) eliminating additional documenta-
tion for psychiatric service animals; (B) protecting the ability of travelers to use 
emotional support animals in air transportation; and (C) prohibiting air carriers 
from requesting medical documentation regarding the need for a service animal 
as a standard requirement for access.”215 
Another significant issue raised in the ACAAA is the remedy available to 
individuals with disabilities who believe that an air carrier has discriminated 
 
CARRIER RESPONSE TO REVISED SERVICE ANIMAL PROPOSAL, supra note 201, at 3 (conclud-
ing it was not feasible to have documentation be submitted at the time of ticketing). 
207  CARRIER RESPONSE TO REVISED SERVICE ANIMAL PROPOSAL, supra note 201, at 3–4; see 
also supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing forty-eight-hour rule and interpreta-
tion). 
208  CARRIER RESPONSE TO REVISED SERVICE ANIMAL PROPOSAL, supra note 201, at 5. 
209  Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 83 Fed. Reg., 23,832, 23,836, (May 23, 2018) 
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382). None of the representatives of the ACCESS Advisory 
Committee voted against discontinuing discussions of the service and support animal issue 
although a few members abstained. U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., ACCESS COMM., RESOLUTION 1, 
18 (2016) (providing resolution including vote tally sheets). 
210  See supra note 209 and accompanying text; infra notes 211–25 and accompanying text. 
211  Air Carrier Access Amendments Act of 2017, S. 1318, 115th Cong. (2017). 
212  Air Carrier Access Amendments Act of 2018, H.R. 5004, 115th Cong. (2018). 
213  H.R. 5004; S. 1318.  
214  H.R. 5004, § 2(a)(2)(D). 
215  Id. § 6(a)(3). 
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against them in contravention of the ACAA.216 Because there is no express lan-
guage in the ACAA covering the issue, courts have split on whether an individ-
ual with such a claim may bring a private right of action against an air carrier in 
court, though recent court cases generally have determined there is no private 
right of action.217 The ACAAA’s congressional findings stated “[u]nlike other 
civil rights statutes, the ACAA does not contain a private right of action, which 
is critical to the enforcement of civil rights statutes. Legislation is necessary to 
correct this anomaly.”218 
The ACAAA would have resolved this issue by providing for persons, who 
believe that they have been injured by a violation of the ACAA, to have a right 
to “bring a civil action in an appropriate” United States district court.219 In ad-
dition to compensatory and punitive damages, plaintiffs could have been 
 
216  See supra note 215 and accompanying text; infra notes 217–18 and accompanying text 
(discussing the portion of the legislation that would incorporate a private right of action into 
the ACAA). 
217  Compare Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 678, 690 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) 
(denying summary judgment motion to dismiss ACAA claims), with Stokes v. Sw. Airlines, 
887 F.3d 199, 202–03, 205 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding the ACAA does not provide for a private 
right of action given the “comprehensive administrative scheme” provided in the ACAA) 
(emphasis omitted); Mapp-Leslie v. Norwegian Airlines, No. 19-CV-7142 (PKC), 2020 WL 
264919, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2020) (citing to Stokes and holding that an individual did 
not have a claim based on the ACAA because the ACAA does not confer a private right of 
actions). Although the remedies available to aggrieved passengers are important (as having a 
private right of action may incentivize carriers to be more cautious in their application of the 
ACAA), because the focus of this Article is on the “front-end” of the process, the issue will 
not be discussed in depth. The Stokes case provides a useful recitation of the administrative 
process relating to enforcement. Stokes, 887 F.3d at 203. As the Stokes case discusses: (1) 
passengers are to notify the DOT through a complaint process; and (2) the DOT investigates 
and if, after a hearing, there is a finding of an ACAA violation, the DOT must issue an order 
to compel the carrier to comply but may take further action through civil penalties of up to 
$25,000, revocation of an air carrier certificate, or filing its own civil action. Id. (citing to 
ACAA). Aggrieved passengers can seek judicial review to compel the DOT to investigate, 
and there is a provision allowing for publication of disability-related complaint data. Id. (cit-
ing to ACAA). It is perhaps this lack of a clear private right of action that emboldened air 
carriers to make changes to their service animal policies that appeared to be in clear contra-
vention of the provisions of the ACAA then in effect. See Alana Wise, Delta Air to Tighten 
Rules for Onboard Service Animals, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2018, 5:07 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-delta-air-safety-animals/delta-air-to-tighten-rules-for-on 
board-service-animals-idUSKBN1F81G9 [https://perma.cc/CS56-KF3T] (announcing Del-
ta’s new rules and stating “the carrier had been in touch with the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation prior to issuing the new guidance . . . .”); supra notes 123–26 and accompanying 
text (discussing air carriers’ adoption of provisions, including initial provisions that increase 
the required documentation and notice in order to travel with a service animal). 
218  H.R. 5004, § 2(b)(6). The legislation also includes provisions that would allow individu-
als with disabilities to make complaints relating to discrimination by air carriers prohibited 
by the ACAA. Id. § 4(d). 
219  Id. § 4(e)(1)(A). The Attorney General may also bring a civil action on behalf of such 
persons. Id. § 4(e)(2)(A). 
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awarded reasonable attorney fees and other costs associated with the litigation 
if this legislation had been enacted.220 
Another piece of legislation (“Behavior Training Legislation”) would have 
provided the definition of service animal under the ACAA to mirror the defini-
tion of service animal provided in Title II and Title III regulations of the 
ADA.221 The Behavior Training Legislation also would have required the Sec-
retary of the DOT, in consultation with others, to “establish a standard of ser-
vice animal behavior training that an individual with a disability shall adhere to 
in seeking accommodation involving a service animal from an air carrier.”222 
The Behavior Training Legislation would also have made it clear that a 
person who “knowingly and willfully makes a false statement for the purpose 
of seeking accommodation involving an animal from an air carrier” relating to 
the status of the animal as a service animal or that the animal meets the stand-
ard set by the animal behavior training may be punished pursuant to a general 
provision of the United States Code regarding false representations.223 
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, passed by the House of Representa-
tives in April 2018 and enacted in October 2018, contains a section that re-
quired the DOT to engage in the rulemaking process and issue a new rule with-
in eighteen months after the Act’s enactment, “to develop minimum standards 
for what is required for service and emotional support animals carried in air-
craft cabins.”224 This Act required the Secretary of the DOT to consider “rea-
sonable measures to ensure pets are not claimed as service animals,” where 
such measures might contain documentation such as photo identification and 
other measures related to the safety of all passengers, including the possibility 
of requiring “third-party proof of behavioral training for a service animal 
. . . .”225 In addition, the Secretary of the DOT was required to consider 
“whether to align the definition of ‘service animal’ with the definition of that 
term” used by the DOJ ADA regulations.226 
The DOT announced the beginning of another rulemaking process in 
2018.227 As seen in the discussion of the proposed rulemaking below, the DOT 
 
220  Id. § 4(e)(1)(B). 
221  S. 2738, 115th Cong. § 1(d)(1)(B) (2018); see also supra note 35 and accompanying text 
(defining service animal under the Title II and Title III regulations of the ADA). 
222  S. 2738 § 1(d)(3). 
223  Id. § 1(d)(2); see also infra note 275 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018), the referenced 
section of the code prohibiting false statements or representations and providing for a penal-
ty of a fine or imprisonment of not more than five years). 
224  FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 437, 132 Stat. 3186, 3344 
(2018). 
225  Id. at 3344–45. 
226  Id. at 3344. 
227  See U.S. Department of Transportation Seeks Comment on Amending Regulations Con-
cerning Service Animals on Flights, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (May 16, 2018), https://www.trans 
portation.gov/briefing-room/dot3618 [https://perma.cc/6N3C-AMCU]. 
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has incorporated many of the issues raised by the Reg-Neg process and legisla-
tion in its call for comments.228 
E. Proposed Rulemaking in 2018 
In May 2018, the DOT published an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule-
making relating to traveling by air with service animals.229 The DOT cited to 
several rationales to support the need for proposed rulemaking.230 Consumer 
complaints, the majority from passengers whose PSAs or ESAs had not been 
accepted for transport, continued to be received by the DOT.231 Concerns about 
the transportation of unusual species, including birds and pigs, have also been 
raised by airlines and disability rights advocates.232 Airlines asserted they be-
lieve the increase in the number of service animals is due to people misrepre-
senting the status of pets as ESAs or PSAs.233 This is connected to the concern 
over untrained service animals causing safety issues.234 Airlines caution that the 
ability to assess the behavior of a service animal in a gate area may not be suf-
ficient to determine an animal’s behavior in the aircraft itself.235 
Potential conflicts caused by the application of the DOJ’s service animal 
definition under ADA Title II in airports is also raised as a rationale for the 
rulemaking.236 The DOT referenced the prior Request for Rulemaking by the 
 
228  See infra notes 239–48 and accompanying text (setting forth issues on which the DOT is 
asking for comments and information from the public). 
229  Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,832 (May 23, 2018) (to be codi-
fied at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382). 
230  Id. at 23,834–35. This section discusses the concerns relating to service animals. In addi-
tion, the DOT cited to its obligation under legislation enacted in 2016 that requires it to “is-
sue a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking on five issues[,]” including service ani-
mals. Id. at 23,835. 
231  Id. at 23,834. Complaints regarding service animals was the fourth highest area of com-
plaints against airlines relating to disabilities in 2016 and 2017. Id. 
232  Id. Disability rights advocates question whether these animals can be trained to behave 
safely in a public setting and believe the use of such animals could “erode the public’s trust” 
in the use of more traditional service animals. Id. But see supra note 131 and accompanying 
text (discussing the DOT’s downplaying of concerns over the use of nontraditional species in 
the rulemaking associated with the 2009 regulations). 
233  Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 83 Fed. Reg. at 23,834. Airlines also raised the 
issue of the ease with which physical indicators of the status of an animal as a service animal 
(such as a harness or vest) can be obtained online. Id.; see also infra Section IV.A (discuss-
ing concerns about misrepresentation and how some states are addressing the issue). 
234  Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 83 Fed. Reg. at 23,834. One airline reported an 
increase of 84 percent in problems relating to the behavior of service animals including uri-
nating and biting. Id. The DOT also referenced “a few highly-publicized reports of service 
animals biting passengers.” Id. 
235  Id. 
236  Id.; see also supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (discussing definition of service 
animal under Titles II and III of the ADA). 
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PSDS and another request by Airlines for America to address the issues.237 Ten 
disability advocacy organizations also raised concerns with the DOT about the 
revised service animal policies announced by two airlines.238 
The DOT solicited comments in the following areas: 
(1) Whether psychiatric service animals should be treated similar to other ser-
vice animals;239 (2) whether there should be a distinction between emotional 
support animals and other service animals;240 (3) whether emotional support an-
imals [and other service animals] should be required to travel in pet carriers for 
the duration of the flight;241 (4) whether the species of service animals and emo-
tional support animals that airlines are required to transport should be limited;242 
(5) whether the number of service animals/emotional support animals should be 
 
237  Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 83 Fed. Reg. at 23,835; Letter from Sharon L. 
Pinkerton, Senior Vice President Policy, Airlines for Am., to James Owen, Deputy Gen. 
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (Jan. 31, 2018) (on file at https://www.regulations.gov/doc 
ument?D=DOT-OST-2015-0246-0314 [https://perma.cc/6CZ4-JFBW]) (encouraging the 
DOT to amend the service animal rule and emphasizing its concerns over safety issues aris-
ing from passengers bringing untrained animals onto flights). As part of its December 2017 
response to a different DOT proposal, Airlines for America raised the economic cost of pas-
sengers without disabilities bringing animals on flights purportedly as PSAs or ESAs evad-
ing airlines’ policies. Comments of Airlines for America Part Two: Proposals for Repeal or 
Amendment of Specific DOT Economic Regulations at 27–28, No. DOT-OST-2017-0069 
(U.S. Dep’t Transp. Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-20 
17-0069-2751 [https://perma.cc/XU2U-JSKU] (last visited Feb. 27, 2020).  
238  Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 83 Fed. Reg. at 23,835. 
239  The DOT referenced the DOJ’s ADA regulations that treat service animals accompany-
ing people with physical and psychiatric disabilities the same but raised concerns over fraud 
if there was not documentation required. Id. at 23,838. The DOT raised the concerns of disa-
bility advocates about the stigmatization of persons with psychiatric disabilities due to the 
current distinction in the ACAA 2009 Regulations over service animals and PSAs and the 
cost associated with the requirement of third-party documentation. Id. The DOT cited to a 
report provided to it from three organizations that stated that the average time to obtain such 
documentation is thirty-one days with the average cost being over $150. Id. The DOT also 
requested feedback on whether it would be rational to continue to allow airlines to require 
forty-eight hours advance notice for PSAs and ESA. Id. at 23,839. 
240  The DOT asked whether ESAs should be included in the definition of service animals at 
all, and, even if included, whether and what type of documentation might be appropriate. Id. 
The DOT cited to the ability of housing providers to request documentation as an example of 
another circumstance when such documentation is required. Id.; see also supra notes 99–105 
and accompanying text (analyzing documentation allowed under the FHA). 
241  The DOT focused on the containment of ESAs, citing to the belief by some organizations 
that the increase in ESAs is the reason for the increasing number of behavioral issues and the 
fact that some airports already require ESAs to be contained in a pet carrier. Traveling by 
Air with Service Animals, 83 Fed. Reg. at 23,839. 
242  One area that the major stakeholders appear to agree on is there should be some limita-
tion of species. Id. However, there is not agreement on whether dogs should be the only spe-
cies of service animal allowed or whether other species, including miniature horses and cap-
uchin monkeys, should be allowed. Id. at 23,839–40; see also Huss, Context, supra note 24, 
at 1182–89 (analyzing the issue of miniature horses and capuchin monkeys when the DOJ 
was revising the ADA’s Title II and Title III regulations). If ESAs are still allowed, the DOT 
inquired whether other species should be acceptable as ESAs. Traveling by Air with Service 
Animals, 83 Fed. Reg. at 23,839–40.  
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limited per passenger;243 (6) whether an attestation should be required from all 
service animal and emotional support animal users that their animal has been 
trained to behave in a public setting;244 (7) whether service animals and emo-
tional support animals should be harnessed, leashed, or otherwise tethered;245 
(8) whether there are safety concerns with transporting large service animals 
and[,] if so, how to address them;246 (9) whether airlines should be prohibited 
from requiring a veterinary health form or immunization record from service an-
imal users without an individualized assessment that the animal would pose a di-
rect threat to the health or safety of others or would cause a significant disrup-
tion in the aircraft cabin;247 and (10) whether U.S. airlines should continue to be 
held responsible if a passenger traveling under the U.S. carrier’s code is only al-
 
243  The DOT asked whether individuals should have to justify being accompanied by more 
than one service animal or ESA. Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 83 Fed. Reg. at 
23,840. The DOT referenced its guidance that recognizes that a passenger may have a legit-
imate need for more than one service animal, but the DOT’s Office of Aviation Enforcement 
and Proceedings “has chosen not to pursue action against carriers that refuse to accept more 
than three service animals per person.” Id. 
244  The DOT raised the possibility of requiring documentation that would require passengers 
to attest that their animal is trained to behave appropriately (or alternatives to documenta-
tion) to address concerns about the difficulty in determining whether an animal can behave 
appropriately while on the aircraft and whether such a requirement would reduce the safety 
risk of such animals. Id. The DOT recognized the lack of a documentation requirement in the 
ADA’s Title II and Title III regulations but queried whether the circumstance that “air travel 
involves people being in a limited space for a prolonged period without the ability to freely 
leave” may require greater assurances in this context. Id. As with other aspects of the pro-
posed rulemaking, the DOT also raised the concern that such a requirement would serve as a 
barrier for persons with disabilities in travel. Id. 
245  The DOT recognized that the 2009 ACAA regulations do not contain specific language 
regarding tethering, unlike the ADA Title II and Title III regulations, and asked for com-
ments about whether such requirement could reduce the likelihood of problems with the ser-
vice animal injuring others. Id. 
246  The 2009 ACAA Regulations and related guidance already contain several provisions 
relating to seat location, but the DOT requested additional feedback regarding how it has 
handled the issue in the past given the concerns of airlines and other passengers (who may be 
requested to share foot space with service animals). Id. at 23,841. The DOT reported that 
“[s]ome airlines have urged the [DOT]” to adopt size or weight limitations for ESAs. Id.; see 
also supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of a breed, size, or weight 
limitation for service animals under the ADA and assistance animals under the FHA). 
247  The DOT recognized that a few airlines had adopted policies requiring additional forms 
to be provided regarding animals’ health or behavior. Traveling by Air with Service Ani-
mals, 83 Fed. Reg. at 23,841. The DOT requested the airlines provide data on the number 
and types of incidents of misbehavior, in particular the number of incidents involving an an-
imal biting a person, to support the claims of increasing incidents. Id. The American Veteri-
nary Medical Association (AVMA) raised its concern that the forms required by airlines ne-
cessitating a veterinarian attest to an animal’s behavior and health is of concern. Id. The 
AVMA articulated the limits of the ability of veterinarians to provide information regarding 
the behavior of animals in this specific environment. Id. It also voiced concerns by veterinar-
ians that the information they are being asked to attest to on the forms may lead to veterinar-
ians refusing to complete the forms. Id. The DOT asked for comments regarding whether 
alternatives to a veterinarian certificate (such as a rabies certificate) would be an alternative 
to such documentation. Id. at 23,841–42. 
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lowed to travel with a service dog on a flight operated by its foreign code share 
partner.248 
On the same day that the DOT announced its advanced notice of rulemak-
ing, it posted an Interim Statement of Enforcement Priorities Regarding Service 
Animals.249 The DOT recognized that a few airlines had adopted policies that 
added documentation or other requirements for passengers accompanied by 
service animals.250 In recognition of the length of time associated for the rule-
making process, the DOT’s Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings 
(the “Enforcement Office”) issued the statement about its intended enforcement 
focus until the revisions are completed.251 The Enforcement Office stated it 
would focus on “clear violations of the current rule that have the potential to 
adversely impact the largest number of persons.”252 
Although the Enforcement Office indicated it may take action against U.S. 
carriers for failing to transport any type of service animal, it stated it would 
concentrate its resources on ensuring that carriers continue to accept “dogs, 
cats, and miniature horses . . . .”253 The Enforcement Office announced that, 
consistent with past guidance, it would not take action against airlines if they 
limit passengers to the transportation of no more than three task-trained service 
animals.254 However, the Enforcement Office stated it did “not intend to take 
action” against carriers that limit passengers to the transportation of only one 
ESA.255 
The Enforcement Office articulated it would not use its “resources to pur-
sue enforcement action against airlines for requiring proof of a [PSA’s or 
ESA’s] vaccination, training, or behavior . . . .”256 Although the Enforcement 
Office stated it would continue to monitor the types of information airlines re-
 
248  Id. at 23,838. The DOT has not acted against U.S. carriers for foreign carriers’ refusal to 
transport species other than dogs on code share flights, but the DOT asked whether the new 
regulations should explicitly state that U.S. carriers will not be held responsible in these cir-
cumstances. Id. at 23,842. 
249  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,804 (May 
23, 2018) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382). 
250  Id. at 23,805. The DOT described some of these policies that added requirements for 
documentation supporting the health and vaccination status of animals and passenger attesta-
tions that the behavior of their animals would not pose a direct threat to persons aboard the 
aircraft. Id. 
251  Id. 
252  Id. at 23,805–06. 
253  Id. at 23,806. The Enforcement Office articulated that this is because these “are the most 
commonly used service animals.” Id. 
254  Id. 
255  Id. The Enforcement Office stated “it is less clear that passengers require more than one 
ESA for travel or at the passenger’s destination.” Id. 
256  Id. at 23,807. The Enforcement Office referenced the fact that the regulations already 
allow for forty-eight hours of advance notice for passengers traveling with PSAs and ESAs 
which allows carriers to assess such documentation. Id. In contrast, travelers with service 
animals, other than PSAs and ESAs, should not be subject to such documentation require-
ments. Id. 
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quested to support travel for PSAs and ESAs, it did not believe such require-
ment “would make travel with those animals unduly burdensome or effectively 
impossible . . . .”257 The Enforcement Office also stated it “will not take action 
against carriers that impose reasonable restrictions on the movement of ESAs 
in the cabin,” including the requirement that an animal be confined to a carrier, 
or be on a leash.258 
The Enforcement Office did announce it would continue to enforce some 
aspects of the 2009 ACAA Regulations.259 The Enforcement Office reiterated 
that the 2009 ACAA Regulations only allow carriers to require advance notice 
under limited circumstances and that it would use its resources to enforce such 
rules.260 The Enforcement Office also indicated it would continue to enforce the 
obligation of carriers to accept credible verbal assurances for service animals 
(other than PSAs and ESAs) if a passenger’s disability is unclear, rather than 
allowing them to impose a documentation requirement on everyone.261 Airlines 
responded by revising their service animal polices to be consistent with the En-
forcement Office’s guidance.262 
 
257  Id. 
258  Id. The reasonableness of the restriction is based on the size of the animal, so, in some 
cases, it would be reasonable to require the animal to stay on the floor at the feet of a pas-
senger. Id. The 2018 Enforcement Priorities traced the history of the DOT interpretation that 
allowed for service animals to be carried on the lap of passengers so long as the animal did 
not weigh more than a child less than two years old. Id. This is based on a 2010 letter that 
interpreted the regulation as not allowing carriers to require the restriction of service ani-
mals. Id. at 23,807 n.6. 
259  Infra notes 260–61 and accompanying text (discussing aspects of the regulations that 
would continue to be enforced). 
260  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 83 Fed. Reg. at 23,806; see 
also supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of carriers to require ad-
vance notice for PSAs and ESAs and for all animals if a flight segment is scheduled to take 
over eight hours). 
261  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 83 Fed. Reg. at 23,806. The 
Enforcement Office also reiterated that airlines should not require passengers traveling with 
service animals to check-in at a ticket counter rather than utilizing electronic check-in proce-
dures. Id. 
262  Emotional Support Animals, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, https://www.southwest.com/html/cu 
stomer-service/unique-travel-needs/customers-with-disabilities-pol.html?CLK=SITESEAR 
CH [https://perma.cc/R9WQ-5ZUL] (last visited Feb. 27, 2020); Service and Support Ani-
mals, DELTA AIRLINES, https://www.delta.com/us/en/accessible-travel-services/service-an 
imals [https://perma.cc/QE97-T47K] (last visited Feb. 27, 2020) (describing Delta airlines’ 
policy including changes through 2018 and 2019); Service Animals, UNITED AIRLINES, 
https://www.united.com/web/en-us/content/travel/specialneeds/disabilities/assistance_an 
imals.aspx?POS=US (last visited Feb. 27, 2020); Trained Service Animals, SOUTHWEST 
AIRLINES, https://www.southwest.com/html/customer-service/unique-travel-needs/customer 
s-with-disabilities-pol.html?CLK=SITESEARCH [https://perma.cc/X6Z3-A8VD] (last visit-
ed Feb. 27, 2020). 
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F. Final Statement of Enforcement Priorities in 2019 
In August 2019, the DOT issued a Final Statement of Enforcement Priori-
ties (“Final Statement”) addressing comments and responses based on the May 
2018 Interim Statement of Enforcement Priorities.263 Although many of the 
priorities were similar to those set forth in the Interim Statement of Enforce-
ment Priorities, there were a few notable exceptions.264 
The DOT reiterated that it would continue to focus its enforcement discre-
tion on the most commonly used service animals (dog, cats, and miniature 
horses), allow for a limit of three service animals, and would consider contain-
ment of ESAs on a case-by-case basis.265 However, unlike the interim state-
ment, in the Final Statement, passengers utilizing all categories of service ani-
mals, including passengers with apparent physical disabilities, can be required 
to provide additional documentation regarding an animals vaccination, training, 
or behavior.266 
The DOT also provided guidance in the Final Statement on new re-
strictions announced by airlines.267 The DOT announced that although airlines 
may find any specific animal poses a direct threat based on behavior, “a limita-
tion based exclusively on breed of the service animal is not allowed.”268 Simi-
larly the DOT announced a categorical ban on service animals of a specific 
weight would be inconsistent with the ACAA.269 However, the DOT articulated 
that the age of a service animal could be taken into consideration, and it did not 
 
263  Guidance on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 84 Fed. Reg. 
43,480, 43,481 (Aug. 21, 2019) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382). 
264  See supra notes 249–61 and accompanying text (discussing the Interim Statement of En-
forcement Priorities). 
265  Guidance on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 84 Fed. Reg. at 
43,481–82, 43,484. Airlines are still subject to enforcement action if they refuse to transport 
any other species of animals, other than snakes, reptiles, ferrets, rodents and spiders. Id. at 
43,481. The DOT indicated that airlines may also continue to limit the total number of ESAs 
per passenger to one but are not allowed to limit the total number of service animals on a 
flight. Id. at 43,482. The advance notice requirement and use of credible verbal assurances to 
prove a service animal’s status by a passenger with a clearly visible disability also remained 
unchanged. Id. 
266  Id. at 43,484. The DOT also indicated it would not consider it a violation for airlines to 
require lobby check-in for passengers traveling with PSAs and ESAs. Id. at 43,483. Howev-
er, the DOT also made it clear that any additional documentation requirement for non-PSA 
or ESA service animals could not result in an advance notice requirement for those passen-
gers. Id. at 43,486. 
267  Id. at 43,485. 
268  Id. (citing to a June 22, 2018 DOT statement). As of February 2020, Delta Airlines’ poli-
cy was continued to deny access to passengers utilizing pit bull type dogs as service animals. 
Service and Support Animals, supra note 262. 
269  Guidance on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 84 Fed. Reg. at 
43,485. 
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anticipate exercising its enforcement discretion if airlines would not accept any 
service animals under four months old.270 
One of the policies that several airlines initially instituted was requiring 
passengers accompanied by PSAs or ESAs to use a specific form to prove the 
status of these animals.271 The DOT made it clear that airlines were required to 
comply with existing regulations regarding this issue (which set forth the in-
formation that can be required but do not mandate a particular form).272 
G. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 2020 
The DOT announced a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in January 2020.273 
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“2020 ACAA NPRM”) was published in 
the Federal Register on February 5, 2020 and provided for comments to be filed 
by April 6, 2020.274 The DOT set forth the statutory authority for the rulemak-
ing and reiterated the compelling factors that would justify the revision to the 
regulations.275 The DOT set forth background on prior requests for rulemaking 
and referred back to the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 to support the rule-
making process.276 
The 2020 ACAA NPRM proposes to use the DOJ’s ADA definition of ser-
vice animal as “a dog that is individually trained to do work or perform 
tasks.”277 Emotional support animals would not be required to be accommodat-
 
270  Id. The basis for this is that all the animals covered under the ACAA “are expected to be 
sufficiently trained” for public access. Id. 
271  Id. at 43,486. 
272  Id. The DOT also reiterated that not allowing passengers to bring ESAs on flight seg-
ments lasting eight hours or more would be prohibited by the regulations but that the airlines 
could continue to follow the existing regulations and require passengers to provide documen-
tation to support the ability of the animal to relieve him or herself in a manner that is not a 
health or sanitation issue (or not need to relieve him or herself). Id. at 43,485–86. 
273  U.S. Department of Transportation Seeks Comment on Proposed Amendments to Regula-
tion of Service Animals on Flights, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.transpo 
rtation.gov/briefing-room/us-department-transportation-seeks-comment-proposed-amendme 
nts-regulation-service [https://perma.cc/7JMM-VQB5]. 
274  Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. 6448 (Feb. 5, 2020) (to be codified 
at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382). 
275  Id. at 6448–51. These included complaints about service animals, issues with the use of 
inconsistent definitions of service animal compared with the DOJ’s ADA Title I and II defi-
nition, passengers attempting to fly with unusual species of animals, concerns that passen-
gers flying with pets may be misrepresenting the status of an animal, and misbehavior of 
service animals. Id. at 6449–50. 
276  Id. at 6450–51; see also supra notes 224–26 and accompanying text (discussing the FAA 
Reauthorization Act of 2018). 
277  Traveling by Air with Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. at 6454 (defining a “service animal 
as a dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of a qualified 
individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other 
mental disability.”). 
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ed as service animals, but air carriers could transport them under the same 
terms as the air carriers transport pets.278 
No species of animals other than dogs would be required to be transport-
ed.279 Similarly to the DOJ, the 2020 ACAA NPRM proposes that airlines 
would be allowed to deny transportation to an animal if the animal “poses a di-
rect threat to the health or safety of others” through an individualized assess-
ment, and took the position that airlines “should continue to be prohibited from 
restricting service animals based solely on the breed or generalized type of 
dog.”280 The 2020 ACAA NPRM also proposes that airlines could restrict the 
size of service animals to those who “can be placed on [a] passenger’s lap” or 
“fit within [a] passenger’s foot space.”281 
Under the 2020 ACAA NPRM air carriers would be allowed to limit the 
number of service animals traveling per passenger with a disability to two; 
however, air carriers would still not be allowed to limit the total number of ser-
vice animals on a flight.282 Passengers with disabilities would be required to 
maintain control over their service animals similarly to the DOJ’s Title I and 
Title II service animal regulations—“harnessed, leashed, or tethered unless the 
device interferes with the service animal’s work or the passenger’s disability 
prevents use of [those] devices.”283 
The existing documentation requirement for PSA and ESA (pursuant to the 
2009 Regulations) would no longer be applicable (as the proposed definition of 
service animal does not distinguish between passengers regardless of the type 
of disability), however the DOT has proposed three new forms that airlines 
could require passengers traveling with service animals to submit.284 All pas-
sengers with disabilities who wish to be accompanied by a service animal 
would be required to provide a “Service Animal Behavior and Training Attesta-
tion Form.”285 This form is executed by the service animal handler and sets 
forth the definition of service animal, reiterates the rules regarding control, and 
acknowledges that airlines can treat animals who exhibit disruptive behavior as 
 
278  Id. at 6458. 
279  Id. at 6454. The DOT referenced the size limitations on an aircraft in determining wheth-
er to limit the definition of service animals to dogs—and not provide for miniature horses. 
Id. 
280  Id. at 6454, 6476. The language of the proposed regulations refers to an individualized 
assessment to determine whether an animal poses a direct threat but does not specifically 
state that air carriers may not restrict based solely on the appearance of a dog. Id. at 6476. 
281  Id. at 6461. 
282  Id. The inability to limit the total number of service animals on a flight is based on the 
existing regulation that prohibits air carriers from restricting the total number of passengers 
with a disability on a flight. Id. 
283  Id. at 6462. In the event the devices are unable to be used, “voice, signal[s] or other . . . 
means” can be used. Id. The DOT also solicited comments on the definition of service ani-
mal handler as it wanted to distinguish between individuals with disabilities who may be 
traveling with a safety assistant and trainers of service animals. Id. at 6463. 
284  Id. at 6464–70. 
285  Id. at 6465–66. 
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pets, airlines can charge for damage caused by service animals (if they similar-
ly charge passengers without disabilities for such damage), and making false 
statements to secure disability accommodations is fraudulent.286 All passengers 
with service animals could also be required to provide an “Air Transportation 
Service Animal Health Form.”287 This form would be executed by a veterinari-
an and sets forth a description of the service animal as well as rabies vaccina-
tion information.288 Veterinarians would also be required to certify that the vet-
erinarian inspected the animal for infectious, contagious, or communicable 
disease and either check a box stating that “[t]o my knowledge this animal de-
scribed above has not exhibited aggressive behavior or caused serious injury to 
other persons or animals” or provide an explanation of why the veterinarian 
could not check that box.289 Air carriers may require a third form that would be 
completed by service animal handlers traveling on flight segments eight hours 
or longer and certifying how the animal would not be a health or sanitation risk 
on those flights.290 
The editing process and publication of this Article will be completed prior 
to the enactment of any proposed regulatory language in the 2020 ACAA 
NPRM. However, it appears likely that based on the proposed regulatory lan-
guage and DOT’s explanatory comments, passengers traveling with service an-
imals by air will be subject to more documentation requirements and passen-
gers utilizing emotional support animals may be required to confine their 
animals, as well as pay the fees generally applicable to pets, if they wish to 
bring their emotional support animals on flights.291 
Regardless of whether changing the definition of service animal under the 
ACAA and any imposition of new documentation requirements will alleviate 
concerns regarding misrepresentation about the status of animals in the air, in 
response to concerns raised by entities on the ground, states have not waited for 
other federal agencies to revise rules governing the application of the ADA or 
FHA.292 
IV. MISREPRESENTATION AND FRAUD—RESPONSE BY STATES 
The ADA, FHA, ACAA, and their respective regulations do not specify a 
penalty for misrepresentation of an animal as a service or assistance animal.293 
 
286  Id. at 6466. 
287  Id. at 6467–68. 
288  Id. at 6468. 
289  Id. 
290  Id. at 6469–70. 
291  See supra Section III.G. 
292  Infra Section IV.A (analyzing state legislation). 
293  In theory, a general fraud provision, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018), providing for up to 
five years in prison for misrepresentation on matters within the jurisdiction of the United 
States, could be applied to an individual fraudulently asserting that he or she was entitled to 
access with an animal that does not qualify as a service or assistance animal. However, the 
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As discussed in Part II, the ADA allows entities to ask only two questions to 
persons who are accompanied by service animals and, if those answers are ade-
quate, the entities must allow access.294 Similarly, under the 2009 ACAA regu-
lations, air carriers could not ask an individual using a service animal to assist 
with a physical disability to provide documentation if the passenger can pro-
vide credible verbal assurances of the need to be accompanied by the animal.295 
However, even when written documentation can be requested to support the re-
quest for an accommodation, there is continuing confusion over the nature and 
extent of such documentation.296 
There are many media reports of persons being questioned about their use 
of service or assistance animals.297 The use of service animals by individuals 
who do not have apparent disabilities, such as individuals who are diagnosed 
with post-traumatic stress disorder or a traumatic brain injury, can also lead to 
conflicts with persons who are concerned about fraudulent conduct and a per-
ception that the statutes are being misused.298 
 
legislative history of that provision does not support that use and, as of the editing of this 
Article in November 2019, searches in the Westlaw case law database did not return any re-
sults utilizing this provision relating to the misrepresentation of a service or assistance ani-
mal. Search results on file with author; see also supra note 224–25 and accompanying text 
(discussing legislation that would specifically provide that misrepresentation of an animal’s 
status for purposes of obtaining access under the ACAA would be a violation of this section 
of the United States Code). 
294  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(f) (2019); id. § 36.302(c)(6) (stating entities may only inquire 
whether “the animal is required because of a disability and what work or task the animal has 
been trained to perform”). 
295  Supra notes 139, 266 and accompanying text (discussing 2009 ACAA Regulations and 
2018 Enforcement Priorities); see also supra notes 284–90 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing additional documentation requirements in the 2020 ACAA NRPM; however, such doc-
umentation does not require a third party to attest that an individual is a person with a disa-
bility whose service animal assists the individual with such disability). 
296  See 14 C.F.R. § 382.117(d)–(e) (2019) (analyzing documentation issue for access under 
the FHA and ACAA); supra Section II.B. 
297  In addition to agents of entities questioning invitees about their service animals, mem-
bers of the public may trigger incidents. For example, an individual was terminated from 
membership in a grocery store co-op due to her confrontations with other customers over 
animals in the store. See Taft v. Central Co-Op, No. 73917-4-1, 2016 WL 7470088, at *1–2 
(Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2016). Ms. Taft was asked not to approach staff members about 
enforcing service animal regulations after making repeated complaints about animals in the 
store. Id. at *1. A complaint was also made by another shopper about a woman “angrily con-
fronting him about his service animal” although Ms. Taft denied this incident occurred. Id. 
298  The use of service dogs to assist individuals with disabilities such as PTSD appears to be 
increasing. Alma Nunley, Note, Service Dogs for (Some) Veterans: Inequality in the Treat-
ment of Disabilities by the Department of Veterans Affairs, 17 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 261, 
271–75 (2014) (discussing Department of Veterans Affairs’ regulations allowing for the re-
imbursement of expenses for service animals utilized for visual, hearing, or substantial mo-
bility impairment but not if a service animal is used for an individual with PTSD or other 
mental health conditions); see also Huss, Hounds at the Hospital, supra note 6, at 80, 83 
(discussing controversy over the Department of Veterans Affairs’ hesitation to adopt the the-
ory that service dogs should be paired with individuals with PTSD and its continued research 
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The DOJ acknowledged challenges that face entities in determining wheth-
er a dog fits within the service animal definition; however, it chose to retain 
language reflecting the inclusive nature of the services provided to disabled in-
dividuals by these animals.299 ADA regulations provide that an individual can 
be asked to remove a service animal from the premises if the “animal is out of 
control and the animal’s handler does not take effective action to control it 
. . . .”300 It has also been established under the FHA that only a reasonable ac-
commodation must be made, so, if an assistance animal is displaying behavior 
that is out of control, and the handler does not address the issue, the animal 
would likely be able to be excluded from the housing.301 
It is not possible to determine the extent to which there actually is misrep-
resentation.302 It is also unclear whether misrepresentation occurs because peo-
ple are knowingly violating the law or mistaken in their understanding of their 
rights.303 One professor suggests some of the various reasons individuals might 
believe their animals should be allowed access, including: 
[A] misunderstanding of the task or work requirement; an incorrect definition of 
disability; a confusion of laws; the belief that dogs coming from a service dog 
school or trainer always meet the ADA standards; and the mistaken beliefs of 
 
into the issue); Elissa Koehl, Watch Service Dog Calm War Vet’s PTSD Reaction, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/09/16/ins 
piration-nation-service-dog-calms-ptsd/15729181/ [https://perma.cc/F7Y3-BL72] (discusing 
 the K9’s for Warriors program placing service dogs with individuals with PTSD). 
299  Huss, Context, supra note 24, at 1177–79. 
300  28 C.F.R. §§ 35.136(b)(1), 36.302(c)(2)(i) (2019). 
301  See e.g., Friedel v. Park Place Cmty. L.L.C., 747 F. App’x. 775, 776, 778 (11th Cir. 
2018) (affirming judgment in favor of housing provider that required the removal of a dog 
who allegedly exhibited aggressive behavior); Woodside Vill. v. Hertzmark, No. SPH9204-
65092, 1993 WL 268293, at *5–6 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 22, 1993) (allowing a housing pro-
vider to evict a mentally disabled tenant when the housing provider made efforts to accom-
modate the tenant, but the tenant did not comply with the pet policy). Similarly, under the 
ACAA, air carriers are not required to transport an animal if the animal is a “direct threat to 
the health or safety of others [or if] it would cause a significant disruption of cabin service.” 
14 C.F.R. § 382.117(f). 
302  Cohen, Real Problem, supra note 113 (stating in an article relating to possible revisions 
to HUD guidance on assistance animals, “[a]dvocates note that evidence for a supposed fake 
assistance animal crisis has been extremely limited, and many times outrage can be traced 
back to mental health stigma more generally” and “disability rights lawyers emphasize that 
there’s been very little proof of actual widespread fraud.”). 
303  Tiffany Lee, Criminalizing Fake Service Dogs: Helping or Hurting Legitimate Han-
dlers?, 23 ANIMAL L. REV. 325, 329 (2017) (discussing issue of misrepresentation and state 
laws addressing it); see also Regina Schoenfeld-Tacher et al., Public Perceptions of Service 
Dogs, Emotional Support Dogs, and Therapy Dogs, 14 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 
642 (2017) (reporting on survey finding the majority of people are not taking advantage of 
the laws allowing for access for persons with disabilities using assistance animals). 
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medical personnel who may ‘prescribe’ a service dog without a complete under-
standing of relevant service dog laws.304 
Because the focus of these federal laws is on providing access for individu-
als with disabilities, it is not surprising that there is no penalty for misrepresen-
tation in those laws.305 However, in response to concerns about the possible 
misrepresentation of the status of an animal as a service or assistance animal, 
several states have enacted legislative provisions.306 
A.  State Laws and Legislation 
Initially the focus of many of these state laws was on misrepresentation of 
an animal as a service animal in order to have access to public entities or public 
accommodations covered by the ADA.307 It was not uncommon for state stat-
utes to focus on the outward appearance of the purported service animal.308 
 
304  Lee, supra note 303, at 329–30. Professor Lee further analyzed the reasons there could 
be a misunderstanding about the right to have access to public accommodations with an ani-
mal. Id. at 331–37. 
305  See generally NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING 
OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2010) (providing history of adoption of the 
ADA); Chai R. Feldblum et al., The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J.C.L. & C.R. 
187, 187–91, 239–40 (2008) (setting forth history of the ADA and the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008). 
306  Fraudulent Service Dogs, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR., https://www.animallaw.info/co 
ntent/fraudulent-service-dogs [https://perma.cc/36AE-QAC4] (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) 
(providing a map showing state laws addressing the use of fraudulent service animals and 
reporting as of 2019, thirty-one states had “what can be termed true bans on the fraudulent 
representation of pets as service animals.”); States Lead Efforts to Curtail Rampant Abuse of 
Emotional Support Animal Requests, NAT’L APARTMENT ASS’N (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://www.naahq.org/news-publications/states-lead-efforts-curtail-rampant-abuse-
emotional-support-animal-requests [https://perma.cc/79UZ-FC6Y] (discussing efforts by 
states including proposed legislation); see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 365.7(a) (West 2019) 
(providing that knowingly and fraudulently misrepresenting yourself as the owner or trainer 
of a guide, signal, or service dog is a misdemeanor); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5811A (West 
2019) (providing “[a]ny person, not being an individual with a disability or being trained to 
assist individuals with disabilities . . . us[ing] an assistance device, an assistance animal, or a 
service dog in an attempt to gain treatment or benefits as an individual with a disability is 
guilty of a misdemeanor.”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1313 (West 2019) (providing it is a 
Class III misdemeanor for the unlawful use of a guide dog by an individual who is not 
blind); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426-805(1) (West 2019) (providing “[i]t is unlawful for a 
person to fraudulently misrepresent an animal as a service animal or service animal in train-
ing.”). This Article focuses on enacted legislation at the time of the writing of this Article. 
Several state legislatures had proposed legislation at the time of the writing of this Article. 
See, e.g., infra notes 311, 313. 
307  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 1314-A (2016), (amended by H.P 1092, 127th Leg. (Me. 
2016)) (initially adopting language providing it was a civil violation to represent a dog as a 
service dog, but in 2016 adopting language to address concerns regarding the misrepresenta-
tion of an animal as an assistance animal). 
308  See, e.g., id. (initially providing it was a civil violation to fit “a dog with a harness, col-
lar, vest or sign of the type commonly used by blind persons in order to represent that the 
dog is a service dog” and later adding other language); N.H. REV. STAT. § 167-D:8 (2019) 
(providing it is unlawful to misrepresent the status of a handler by fitting an animal with a 
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Language in these statutes focus on the use of a harness, collar, or vest com-
monly used to designate that a dog is acting as a service animal.309 For exam-
ple, Michigan law initially provided persons who are not deaf, audibly im-
paired, or otherwise physically limited “shall not use or be in possession of a 
dog that is wearing a blaze orange leash and collar or harness in any public 
place.”310 The Michigan statute was changed in 2015 to more simply provide it 
is unlawful for a person to “falsely represent that he or she is in possession of a 
service animal, . . . in any public place.”311 
Other state laws initially targeted misrepresentations by individuals by 
word or action.312 An example is legislation enacted by the State of Kansas that 
provided that it is unlawful for any person to “represent that such person has a 
 
collar, harness, or a tag representing an animal is a service animal); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-
29.5 (West 2019) (providing a fine of not more than $500 if an individual “fits a dog with a 
harness of the type commonly used by blind persons in order to represent that such dog is a 
guide dog when training of the type that guide dogs normally receive has not in fact, been 
provided . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 168-4.5 (West 2019) (providing “[i]t is unlawful to 
disguise an animal as a service animal or service animal in training” and stating the violation 
of the section constitutes a Class 3 misdemeanor); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 121.006(a) 
(West 2019) (providing if a “person who uses a service animal with a harness or leash of the 
type commonly used by persons with disabilities who use trained animals, in order to repre-
sent that his or her animal is a specially trained service animal when training has not in fact 
been provided,” the person can be punished with a fine and community service). 
309  This type of gear is readily available online, and there are no restrictions on its purchase. 
See, e.g., Service Dog Vests, Patches, Gear & Accessories, SERVICEDOGVEST.COM, 
http://servicedogvest.com/?gclid=CIrC59j3mMECFWqCMgodciUAZw [https://perma.cc/M 
VC3-4CJC] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020) (providing gear for service and assistance animals). 
310  H.B. 4527, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015) (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 752.61, 752.62, 752.63 (West 2016)) (knowing violation of the act was a misdemeanor 
offense). Because designating a specific colored collar, harness, or leash as indicating an an-
imal is a service animal is not required by the regulations implementing the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, this type of language, while perhaps well-meaning would have limited ef-
fectiveness. See supra Section I.B (discussing language regarding ADA). 
311  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.62 (West 2019). The Michigan Senate passed legislation 
in 2015 to provide for liability for misrepresentation of an emotional support animal in the 
context of housing similar to the language of the Indiana statute discussed herein. See H.B. 
4527, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015) (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.62 
(West 2016)) (providing language and legislative history of statutory provision on misrepre-
sentation); infra notes 318–22 and accompanying text (discussing Indiana statute). 
312  See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 209.204 (West 2019) (stating that the definition of “imper-
sonates a person with a disability” includes “representation of a dog by word or action as a 
service dog”). Note that legislation was pre-filed in December 2018 to amend this Missouri 
provision to include language regarding assistance animals and housing. H.B. 107, 100th 
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-5b-106(2) (West 
2019) (providing it is a Class C misdemeanor if a person intentionally falsely “represents to 
another person that an animal is a service animal” or “intentionally misrepresents a material 
fact to a health care provider for the purpose of obtaining documentation from the health 
care provider necessary to designate an animal as a service animal . . . .”). Legislation was 
introduced in Utah in 2018 to add language regarding the misrepresentation of assistance 
animals. H.B. 407, 62nd Leg., 2018 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2018) (providing additional language 
relating to misrepresentation of assistance animals). 
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disability for the purpose of acquiring an assistance dog unless such person has 
such disability.”313 
Examples of more recently-enacted legislation include that of Indiana, 
Pennsylvania, and Colorado.314 The Indiana legislation, effective on July 1, 
2018, defined an “emotional support animal” as a “companion animal that a 
health service provider has determined provides a benefit for an individual with 
a disability, which may include improving at least one (1) symptom of the disa-
bility.”315 Health service provider is defined as a physician, psychiatrist, psy-
chologist, advanced practice nurse, and certain therapists licensed under Indi-
ana law and “who provides medical services and treatment to an individual.”316 
The definition of “health service provider” specifically excludes an individual 
“whose sole service to the individual is to provide a verification letter for a 
fee.”317 
Under the new Indiana law, landlords may require an individual with a dis-
ability that is not readily apparent to provide written verification from a li-
censed health service provider to support a request for accommodation for an 
emotional support animal.318 The individual asserting he or she has a disability 
 
313  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1112(b) (West 2019). The Kansas statute also states it “is a class 
A nonperson misdemeanor” for a person to “[r]epresent that such person has the right to be 
accompanied by an assistance dog . . . unless such person has the right to be accompanied in 
or upon such place by such dog . . . .” Id. § 39-1112(a); see also H.B. 2152, 2019 Leg., Gen. 
Sess. (Kan. 2019) (proposing legislation to address misrepresentation and documentation of 
assistance animals in housing). 
314  See infra notes 315–30 and accompanying text (discussing Indiana, Pennsylvania, and 
Colorado legislation). 
315  IND. CODE § 22-9-7-6 (2019); S.B. 169, 121st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2019) 
(legislation to address the misrepresentation of an animal as a service animal in a public 
place); S.B. 240, 120th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2018) (enacting a new chapter ti-
tled “Emotional Support Animals in Housing”). Another provision clarifies that an emotional 
support animal “does not need specific training . . . .” IND. CODE § 22-9-7-8. 
316  IND. CODE § 22-9-7-4 (listing individuals licensed under specific code provisions and 
including individuals licensed under Indiana Code § 25-23.6, including Marriage and Family 
Therapists). Indiana Code § 25-23.6 provides for licensing of several types of counselors 
including social workers and mental health counselors. 
317  IND. CODE § 22-9-7-4. A court may also consider the source of the documentation in its 
analysis of the validity of a claim that an animal is acting as an assistance animal. Westches-
ter Plaza Holdings v. Sherwood, No. 1431-19, 2019 WL 4023655, at *2 (N.Y. City Ct. Aug. 
23, 2019) (finding that an individual did not meet the burden of establishing that a dog was 
an emotional support animal and noting “that the registration of a dog with this entity can be 
completed by anyone after paying a fee and there is no case law or statute requiring this 
Court to accept this entities [sic] determination that a dog is deemed to be an emotional sup-
port animal.”). 
318  IND. CODE § 22-9-7-9. Landlords may also “evaluate any documents submitted with the 
request for a reasonable accommodation to verify the individual’s disability related need for 
an emotional support animal.” Id. § 22-9-7-11. An “individual who moves from another 
state” is allowed to provide documentation from similar medical professionals licensed in a 
previous state of residence “so long as the individual has an ongoing treatment relationship 
with the health service provider” beyond solely providing a verification letter for a fee. Id. 
§ 22-9-7-10. “Landlords” is used to simplify the description of the law in this Article—the 
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commits a Class A infraction if there is a misrepresentation or material false 
statement regarding the status of the individual as a person with a disability re-
quiring the use of an emotional support animal.319 Health service providers who 
verify the need for an emotional support animal “without adequate professional 
knowledge of the individual’s condition to provide a reliable verification” or 
provide no other service other than charging a fee to provide such written veri-
fication also commit a Class A infraction.320 In addition, the Indiana law pro-
vides for immunity for landlords for injuries to another individual caused by a 
tenant’s emotional support animal.321 
The Indiana law includes provisions consistent with current HUD policy 
such as not allowing landlords to require a fee for an emotional support animal 
but allowing for the landlord to require a tenant to pay for the cost of any dam-
age or repairs to the unit caused by an emotional support animal.322 
The Pennsylvania Assistance and Service Animal Integrity Act became ef-
fective on December 24, 2018.323 The Pennsylvania law more closely tracks the 
language of HUD guidance allowing for landlords to request documentation 
that is “reliable and based on direct knowledge of the person’s disability and 
disability-related need for the assistance animal or service animal.”324 It is a 
misdemeanor for a person to intentionally misrepresent that he or she is entitled 
to have an assistance animal in housing.325 In addition, anyone who creates or 
provides a document misrepresenting the status of an assistance or service ani-
mal for use in housing may commit an offense punishable by a fine not exceed-
ing $1,000.326 Similar to the Indiana law, landlords are not liable for injuries 
caused by assistance animals of their tenants.327 
 
provisions use the terminology a “person who offers to rent or otherwise make available a 
dwelling” and the definition of dwelling includes vacant land for construction of a residence 
and recreational vehicles. Id. §§ 22-9-7-2, 22-9-7-9. 
319  Id. § 22-9-7-12. Fitting “an animal that is not an emotional support animal with a har-
ness, collar, vest, or sign that would cause a reasonable person to believe the animal is an 
emotional support animal” also is included in this subsection regarding false statements or 
misconduct. Id. 
320  Id. A law in Wisconsin, which became effective in April 2018, includes similar coverage 
providing individuals and licensed health care providers will “forfeit not less than $500” if 
there has been misrepresentation of the need for an emotional support animal in housing. 
WIS. STAT. § 106.50(2r)(br)(6) (2018). 
321  IND. CODE § 22-9-7-15. 
322  Id. §§ 22-9-7-13, 22-9-7-14. 
323  68 PA. CONS. STAT. § 405.7 (2019). 
324  Id. § 405.3. The documentation also must be in writing and describe the disability-related 
need for the animal. Id. § 405.3(b). A landlord may only require the documentation if the 
disability-related need is not known to the landlord or readily apparent. Id. § 405.3(a). 
325  Id. § 405.5. 
326  Id. § 405.6. Maine legislation enacted in 2016 also does not limit potential liability to 
licensed health care providers, establishing that it is a civil violation for anyone to knowingly 
create or provide documents to another person that falsely represent or state an animal is a 
service or assistance animal. ME. STAT. tit. 17, § 1314-A (2019). Like the Indiana and Penn-
sylvania statutes, Maine law also provides it is unlawful to fit an animal with physical mani-
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Colorado legislation, which became effective on January 1, 2017, appears 
to recognize that individuals may not be aware of the ramifications of misrepre-
senting the status of an animal as a service or assistance animal.328 A person 
commits the offense of intentional misrepresentation of a service animal or as-
sistance animal only if he or she has previously received an oral or written 
warning that it is illegal to misrepresent a service or assistance animal respec-
tively.329 The Colorado law also emphasizes the importance of public education 
by authorizing the state’s division of civil rights to create and publicize signage 
for public accommodations and forms for housing providers to assist licensed 
health care providers in making a determination of whether an individual has a 
disability as well as the need for an assistance or service animal.330 
As discussed above, the Michigan law was amended in 2015, but addition-
al legislation was proposed in 2017 and passed by the state senate in December 
2018, illustrating the rapid pace of change in this area of the law.331 The more 
recent Michigan legislation also focused on the relationship of a licensed health 
care provider with the individual requesting access with a service or emotional 
support animal.332 The Michigan legislation goes farther than the Indiana law 
and requires that the licensed health care provider must (a) “maintain a physical 
office space where [the provider] regularly treats patients,” (b) document that 
the provider has treated the individual requesting the documentation for at least 
six months before the request for the documentation, and (c) upon request pro-
vide a notarized letter certifying the status of the individual “with [the] disabil-
ity is disabled and that [the animal] is necessary to alleviate the effects of the 
disability . . . .”333 
Michigan law already provides for the state’s department of civil rights tel-
ephone hotline to receive reports about persons falsely representing themselves 
as individuals in possession of service animals in training.334 The legislation 
 
festations indicating the animal is a service animal if the animal is not. Id.; 68 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 405.6(a)(3). 
327  68 PA. CONS. STAT. § 405.4. 
328  H.B. 16-1426, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017). 
329  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-13-107.3(1),18-13-107.7(1) (West 2019). The person must 
also know the animal is not a service or assistance animal. Id. §§ 18-13-107.3(1)(c); 18-13-
107.7(1)(c). 
330  Id. § 12-36-142, 12-38-132.5, 12-43-226.5 (providing a licensee should not make such a 
determination unless he or she “[h]as met with the patient[,]” though such meeting can occur 
through telemedicine); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-221(3)(b) (2019) (providing that a 
complaint cannot be filed unless there is a “conspicuous public notice” posted that the loca-
tion only allows service animals and the entity reserves the right to file complaints regarding 
misrepresentation in a provision that became effective on October 1, 2019). A person may 
only be found guilty of a misdemeanor under the new Montana provision if he or she has 
previously been provided a written warning of such offense. Id. § 49-4-222(1)(a). 
331  MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 752.62 (2019); S.B. 663, 99th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Mich. 2017). 
332  S.B. 663, 99th Leg., Gen. Sess. § 2. 
333  Id. 
334  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 752.64. 
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would add reports regarding emotional support animals, or health care provid-
ers falsely certifying the need for such animals, to the types of complaints the 
hotline should receive.335 
As states continue to adopt and revise these types of statutes, it will be im-
portant to ensure that they do not conflict with the protections set forth in fed-
eral law.336 In January 2017, an internal HUD memorandum (“2017 HUD 
Memorandum”) raised concerns about misrepresentation legislation proposed 
in Virginia.337 The 2017 HUD Memorandum did not announce any new guid-
ance regarding service and assistance animals under the FHA, but utilized the 
existing guidance previously announced by HUD and the DOJ.338 
For example, the 2017 HUD Memorandum cautioned that language in the 
proposed legislation allowing “any reasonable regulations applicable to pets” to 
also be applied to persons with assistance animals may be contrary to the FHA 
if it prevented those individuals the ability to use the premises.339 The 2017 
HUD Memorandum also analyzed issues regarding who may provide the doc-
umentation to support an individual’s disability or need for an assistance ani-
mal.340 The ability under existing guidance for individuals to “provide reliable 
verifying information” about themselves or the utilization of a broader category 
of persons familiar with the need, such as an employer, was viewed as being 
inconsistent with the proposed legislation.341 The Virginia legislation also in-
cluded a provision that would have allowed housing providers to reject a rea-
sonable accommodation request without doing a case-by-case assessment if 
there was a negative impact on the insurance coverage for the premises.342 The 
2017 HUD Memorandum argued that the case-by-case analysis would require 
the housing provider to first determine whether a different insurance provider 
could provide equivalent coverage.343 
The Virginia legislature was responsive to the issues addressed by the 2017 
HUD Memorandum, producing a law with language that in many cases mir-
rored the existing HUD guidance.344 Some of the recently proposed and adopt-
 
335  S.B. 663, 99th Leg., Gen. Sess. § 4. 
336  See infra notes 337–43 and accompanying text (analyzing HUD internal memorandum 
raising issues about legislation in Virginia). 
337  Memorandum from Allen W. Levy, Deputy Assistant Gen. Counsel for Fair Hous. En-
forcement to Joseph A. Pelletier, Dir., FHAP Div., FHEO (Jan. 24, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 
HUD Memorandum] (on file with author). 
338  Id. at 1 n.2 (citing to 2004 JOINT STATEMENT and 2013 HUD ASSISTANCE ANIMALS). 
339  Id. at 2. 
340  Id. at 2 nn.2–3 and accompanying text. 
341  Id. at 3. 
342  Id. at 4. 
343  Id. 
344  VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-96.3:1, 36-96.3:2 (2017); see also Virginia to Require Therapeutic 
Relationship for Emotional Support Animal Requests, NAT’L APARTMENT ASS’N (Apr. 11, 
2017), https://www.naahq.org/news-publications/virginia-require-therapeutic-relationship- 
emotional-support-animal-requests [https://perma.cc/M2CS-5ALB] (referencing a comment  
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ed legislation appears to have provisions that are, at a minimum, inconsistent 
with the spirit of HUD guidance in place at the time they were proposed.345 
Virginia law includes a clause specifically addressing the possibility of the un-
enforceability of any of its provisions if they are inconsistent with the FHA.346 
However, states clearly have determined they are going to push forward not-
withstanding the lack of new guidance by HUD.347 
The effectiveness of state law provisions attempting to address the issue of 
misrepresentation and fraud will be difficult to measure.348 To date, there has 
been limited reported case law referencing these state misrepresentation stat-
utes.349 A judge in one case questioned whether, given the limited inquires al-
lowed under the ADA regulations, it would be possible to determine a violation 
of its state law.350 However, it is possible such state laws may deter the inten-
tional misrepresentation of the status of an animal by at least some individu-
als.351 
 
letter submitted by HUD and the response by the Virginia General Assembly). 
345  E.g., supra notes 332–33 and accompanying text (discussing Michigan legislation with 
restrictive definition of persons who can provide documentation). 
346  VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.23 (providing if HUD determines any provision is substantially 
inconsistent with the FHA it shall not be enforceable). 
347  See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text (discussing reports that HUD is planning 
on issuing new guidance). 
348  Huss, Conundrum, supra note 22, at 1590–91 n.150 (reporting on the lack of case law 
utilizing such state statutes); Lee, supra note 303, at 342–50 (raising concerns if such laws 
are enforced, and stating, “[i]t is too early to determine the frequency with which people may 
be arrested, tried, and possibly convicted under the increasing number of service animal 
fraud laws.”). Professor Lee also considers the likelihood of prosecution under these misrep-
resentation laws by analyzing the limited number of reported cases based on the denial of 
access to service animal handlers. Id. at 350. 
349  E.g., Lerma v. Cal. Exposition & State Fair Police, No. 2:12-cv-1363 KJM GGH PS, 
2014 WL 28810, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2014) (providing example of an officer at a water 
park preparing a crime report charging a woman under California Penal Code § 365.7). In 
the Lerma case, an officer directed Ms. Lerma to remove a young dog from the park because 
the officer could not determine whether the dog was a service animal. Id. Ms. Lerma admit-
ted during a deposition that the “dog was not individually trained to perform any task for 
her,” thus not meeting the definition of a service animal under the ADA. Id. at *5. The Ler-
ma court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion finding that the defendants 
were permitted to exclude the dog from the premises. Id. The relevant public safety office 
was contacted to attempt to determine the status of the charge against Ms. Lerma. E-Mail 
from Debra Denslaw, Faculty Servs. Librarian & Assoc. Professor of Law Librarianship, 
Valparaiso Univ. Law Sch., to author (Mar. 10, 2015, 12:33 PM CST) (on file with author). 
Based on the Sacramento county court database, there was no disposition indicated for the 
criminal misdemeanor cited in the case, typically indicating the police “declined to file,” 
which allows the misdemeanor to drop after the passage of 364 days. Id. 
350  Hurley v. Loma Linda Univ. Med. Ctr., No. CV12-5688 DSF (OPx), 2014 WL 580202, 
at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2014) (discussing the difficulty of enforcing the California law). 
351  Sande Buhai, Preventing the Abuse of Service Animal Regulations, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 771, 796 (2016) (suggesting these state statues may create a deterrent effect). 
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Alternatives to the state laws penalizing individuals who misrepresent the 
status of an animal have been suggested by a few commentators.352 Increasing 
education about coverage of the current laws, along with modifications of state 
laws so that such provisions use terminology consistent with the ADA, has 
been proposed.353 Another suggestion is to amend the ADA to allow for entities 
to check identification issued by states with certification and licensing pro-
grams.354 The Province of British Columbia recently enacted a law that incor-
porates a certification and licensing requirement.355 That law is discussed in the 
following section to illustrate the way such a system could work.356 
B. British Columbia Guide Dog and Service Dog Act 
Similar to the United States, there is not a single definition of “service an-
imal” used in Canada.357 The Canadian Human Rights Act does prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of disability.358 However, at the time of the writing of 
this Article, although there was legislation pending, there was no Canadian fed-
eral law equivalent to the ADA.359 
Individual provinces have adopted their own laws that apply to situations 
involving persons with disabilities accompanied by service animals.360 As an 
example, the Guide Dog and Service Dog Act became effective in January 
2016 in the Province of British Columbia.361 This Act prohibits discrimination 
and provides access for service dog teams to public places as well as in hous-
 
352  Id.; Lee, supra note 303, at 351. 
353  Id. Professor Lee also suggested that revisions be made to definitions of service and as-
sistance animals at the federal level to ensure consistency. Id. at 353–54. 
354  Buhai, supra note 351, at 796. But see supra Section I.B (setting forth the DOJ’s position 
regarding certification and licensing requirements in the recent revision of the ADA regula-
tions). 
355  Guide Dog and Service Dog Act Takes Effect, BRITISH COLUMBIA GOV’T NEWS (Jan. 15, 
2016), https://news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2016PSSG0011-000041 [https://perma.cc/U6GY-39 
V7]. 
356  Infra Section IV.B (analyzing British Columbia’s law). 
357  Kelly Doctor & Caitlin Meggs, Lending a Helping Paw: An Overview of the Law of Ser-
vice Animals in Ontario, GOLDBLATT PARTNERS (May 29, 2017), https://goldblattpartners 
.com/wp-content/uploads/LendingaHelpingPaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG34-XK9V] (analyz-
ing the law in Canada with a focus on Ontario law). 
358  Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. 
359  David Lepofsky, What Should Canada’s Promised New National Accessibility Law In-
clude? A Discussion Paper, 38 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 169, 207 (2018) (advocating for a strong 
accessibility law). The Accessible Canada Act was passed by the House of Commons of 
Canada in November 2018. Accessible Canada Act, Bill C-81, House of Commons of Can. 
(2018). 
360  E.g., Province of Alberta Service Dog Act, R.S.A. 2007, c S-7.5(3)(1) (Can.); Province 
of Ontario Blind Persons’ Rights Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.7 (Can.) (including definition of 
guide dog). 
361  Guide Dog and Service Dog Act Takes Effect, supra note 355. 
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ing.362 A “service dog team” is “a person with a disability and service dog 
[who] are certified as a . . . team.”363 
Under the British Columbian law, an individual with a disability must ap-
ply to the designated authority (the registrar) for a certificate which will only be 
issued if the individual and dog together have “successfully completed either (i) 
a guide dog or service dog training program, as the case may be, provided by 
an accredited training school, or (ii) a BC guide dog and service dog assess-
ment . . . .”364 The assessment is modeled after existing tests and standards and 
focuses on appropriate public behavior and disposition of the dog.365 In public 
places, the dog must be “held by a leash or harness.”366 Individuals who do not 
complete a training program through an accredited school must also provide 
documentation supporting their disability completed by a medical practition-
er.367 The law further encourages the obtaining of dogs through accredited 
schools by requiring the teams utilizing the alternative process to successfully 
complete a reassessment before a certification can be renewed.368 Renewal is 
required every two years.369 
Emotional support animals and therapy animals are not covered by the 
Act.370 Individuals have an affirmative obligation to report any changes in their 
 
362  British Columbia Guide Dog and Service Dog Act, S.B.C 2015, c 17, §§ 2–3 (Can.). 
Dog-in-training teams are also protected, though certificates for these teams will only be is-
sued if the applicant is a representative of an “accredited training school.” British Columbia 
Guide Dog and Service Dog Regulation, B.C. Reg. 223/2015, § 5 (Can.). These training 
schools must be accredited by Assistance Dogs International and/or the International Guide 
Dog Federation. Id. § 1. There are also provisions for retired teams to obtain a certificate so 
the dog can remain in housing, although it would not be eligible for public access. Id. § 5; 
Dog-in-Training, Trainer & Retired Dog Certification, BRITISH COLUMBIA https://www2.go 
v.bc.ca/gov/content/justice/human-rights/guide-and-service-dog/certification [https://perma 
.cc/Y5EW-DM83] (last visited Feb. 27, 2020). 
363  British Columbia Guide Dog and Service Dog Act, S.B.C. 2015, c 17, § 1 (Can.). 
364  British Columbia Guide Dog and Service Dog Regulation, B.C. Reg. 223/2015, § 2(2). 
The dog must also be spayed or neutered. Id. 
365  BRITISH COLUMBIA & JUSTICE INST. OF B.C., BC GUIDE DOG AND SERVICE DOG 
ASSESSMENT 2 (2015) (stating it is “modeled after the Assistance Dogs International Public 
Access Test and the Security Dog Validation Standards from the Justice Institute of British 
Columbia.”). 
366  British Columbia Guide Dog and Service Dog Act, S.B.C 2015, c 17, § 2. 
367  British Columbia Guide Dog and Service Dog Regulation, B.C. Reg. 223/2015, § 2(6). 
368  BRITISH COLUMBIA, APPLICATION FOR A GUIDE OR SERVICE DOG CERTIFICATE NEW OR 
RENEWAL (2016) [hereinafter BRITISH COLUMBIA, APPLICATION]. An exception is made to 
this reassessment requirement for teams grandfathered in from the prior system. BRITISH 
COLUMBIA, GUIDE DOG AND SERVICE DOG PROGRAM POLICIES AND PROCESSES § 2.9 (2017) 
[hereinafter BRITISH COLUMBIA, SERVICE DOG POLICIES]. 
369  BRITISH COLUMBIA, SERVICE DOG POLICIES, supra note 368, § 2.9. 
370  British Columbia Guide Dog and Service Dog Act, S.B.C 2015, c 17, § 1 (including in 
the definition of “person with a disability” that the individual must require “as a result of the 
disability, the assistance of a service dog for daily living”); see also BRITISH COLUMBIA, 
APPLICATION, supra note 368 (requiring the applicant to list specialized tasks the dog per-
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or their dogs’ statuses.371 In addition to the structure of the certification process, 
the British Columbia law also prohibits the false representation of a dog as a 
member of a certified team.372 
The British Columbia system is much more extensive than anything cur-
rently required by U.S. federal law.373 In the absence of congressional action 
(and funding), it appears unlikely that such a system would be adopted in the 
United States in the near future.374 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the recent legislative activities by the states, there currently appears 
to be less concern over the possibility of individuals misrepresenting the status 
of a dog in order to gain access to public entities and public accommodations 
compared to housing.375 Even if public entities and public accommodations 
would prefer a certification or licensing regime, the DOJ’s Title II and Title III 
regulations are clear and, based on DOJ activity, there is no indication that the 
DOJ anticipates revising the regulations relating to service animals.376 There is 
also no indication that the EEOC will change the currently existing structure 
under Title I of the ADA, which requires an interactive process, allowing em-
ployers to request documentation to support any request for an accommodation 
involving a service animal.377 
Even if a housing provider is in a jurisdiction where courts have held  that 
the failure to engage in an interactive process is not an independent basis to es-
tablish liability, because such failure may be considered in determining whether 
there has been a denial of a reasonable accommodation request, risk-adverse 
housing providers should establish an internal process that includes an interac-
tive dialogue with individuals who request an accommodation.378 This process 
should not require tenants or other requesters to provide documentation other 
than that necessary to make the minimal determination that an individual is a 
 
forms to assist with day-to-day living, such as alerting to noise or picking up objects); Guide 
Dog & Service Dog Certification, BRITISH COLUMBIA, https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content 
/justice/human-rights/guide-and-service-dog [https://perma.cc/2JL5-RFCN] (last visited Feb. 
27, 2020). 
371  British Columbia Guide Dog and Service Dog Regulation, B.C. Reg. 223/2015, §§ 7–8 
(requiring individuals to report to the registrar changes in name and mailing address or if the 
dog no longer meets the requirements of the act or regulations). 
372  British Columbia Guide Dog and Service Dog Act, S.B.C 2015, c 17, § 4. A person con-
victed of violating that clause can be fined up to $3,000. Id. § 8. 
373  Supra Section I.B (describing the DOJ’s position on certification in prior rulemaking 
process). 
374  Supra Section I.A (discussing the ADA’s focus on reducing barriers to access). 
375  See supra Section IV.A (providing examples of recent state law relating to housing). 
376  See supra Section I.A (describing regulations). 
377  Supra Section I.C (describing Title I regulations and EEOC guidance). 
378  See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text (discussing split in jurisdictions regard-
ing issue of interactive process and the FHA). 
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person with a covered disability and the assistance animal is needed in order for 
the disabled person to use and enjoy the premises.379 Housing providers should 
ensure that they are acting on such requests in a timely manner as failing to 
make a timely determination of a request can serve as a constructive denial of a 
requested accommodation.380 In the absence of updated guidance from HUD, 
housing providers should be cautious of relying on any state law that purports 
to limit who can provide the third-party documentation to support an individu-
al’s request for an accommodation.381 
The forthcoming revision of the ACAA regulations is expected to clarify 
the issue of documentation for passengers and air carriers.382 Even with such 
regulations, there will likely be incidents and concerns about fraud and misrep-
resentation.383 However, the DOT’s regulations will need to remain consistent 
with the language of the ACAA, which is intended to promote access for per-
sons with disabilities.384 
It is a balancing act to ensure access for persons with disabilities partnered 
with service and assistance animals, with safeguards to ensure public safety and 
discourage fraudulent behavior. It appears the balancing act is tipping towards 
more formality, at least with regard to housing and air travel, which may or 
may not be effective in addressing the concerns raised by providers and the 
public. Unless and until Congress passes new legislation, the current hodge-
podge of regulations will likely continue to cause confusion and conflict in this 
area of the law. 
 
379  See supra Section II.B (discussing documentation requirement). 
380  Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(discussing how an indeterminate delay after meaningful review is effectively the same as a 
denial of the request); 2004 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 79, at 11 (stating that a housing 
provider has an obligation to provide a prompt response and an undue delay in such a re-
sponse “may be deemed to be a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation.”). 
381  See supra notes 303, 320–21 and accompanying text (discussing a state law and pro-
posed legislation limiting the persons who can provide such third-party documentation). 
382  See supra Section III.G (discussing proposed rulemaking process). 
383  See supra notes 122–25, 267–68 and accompanying text (discussing media attention and 
concerns over misrepresentation). 
384  See supra notes 117–21 and accompanying text (discussing the ACAA). 
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